Providing international adaptation finance for vulnerable communities : a study on potentials and limits of social investment funds by Horstmann, Britta & Schulz-Heiss, Günther
14-10112_US_Study 80.indd   3 14.02.14   12:53
Providing International Adaptation Finance for 
Vulnerable Communities: A Study on Potentials 
and Limits of Social Investment Funds
 

Providing international adaptation finance for  
vulnerable communities: a study on potentials  
and limits of social investment funds
The German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
(DIE) is a multidisciplinary research, policy advice and training institute for 
 Germany’s bilateral and multilateral development cooperation. On the basis of 
independent research, it acts as consultant to public institutions in Germany and 
abroad on current issues of cooperation between developed and developing 
countries. Through its nine-month training course, the German Development 
Institute prepares German and  European university graduates for careers in the field 
of development policy.
Britta Horstmann is a researcher at the German Development Institute / Deutsches 
Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). Her research currently focuses on questions 
of international and national adaptation politics and finance. She has been working 
in the field of climate change and development for more than 10 years for various 
organisations.
Corresponding author: Britta.Horstmann@die-gdi.de
Günther Schulz-Heiss is an economist who completed his post-graduate training in 
development planning and management at the DIE. He has worked on poverty 
reduction, public investment, and local development in a wide range of development 
agencies and programmes worldwide for more than 30 years, participating in the 
design, development and evaluation of international development cooperation for 
social investment funds in countries such as Bolivia, Peru, Nicaragua, Yemen and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.
Contact address: POB9564@yahoo.com
Studies 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 83
Providing international adaptation finance for  
vulnerable communities: a study on potentials  
and limits of social investment funds
Britta Horstmann
Günther Schulz-Heiss 
Bonn 2014
Studies / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
ISSN 1860-0468
Die deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der 
Deutschen  Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im 
Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche 
Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available at http://
dnb.d-nb.de. 
ISBN 978-3-88985-647-0
© Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH
Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 +49 (0)228 94927-0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 +49 (0)228 94927-130 
E-mail: die@die-gdi.de 
http://www.die-gdi.de
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Hanna Schmole, Ines Waigand, and Erik 
Bertram for their research assistance along with the following persons for 
comments on this study: Ines Dombrowsky, Christian von Haldenwang, 
Jörg Faust, Mihir Bhatt, Nannette Lindenberg, and Erik Lundsgaarde.
This study is based on an earlier report by Günther Schulz-Heiss (2011): 
25 years of social investment funds worldwide: some lessons for current 
challenges of adaptation to climate change, German Development Institute / 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, mimeo. 
Bonn, July 2014 Britta Horstmann, Günther Schulz-Heiss

Contents
Abbreviations
Summary 1
1 Introduction 5
2 Delivering adaptation finance: architecture,  
requirements and challenges  7
2.1 Adaptation finance architecture: a brief overview 8
2.2 Climate change financing requirements 11
2.3 Development financing requirements 17
2.4 Common challenges and assessment criteria 21
2.4.1 Maximising the use of country systems and institutions  
in adaptation finance 25
2.4.2 Support for vulnerable people: finance for small-scale  
adaptation needs and for the local level 28
3 Social investment funds: evolution, geographical  
distribution and financial magnitude 33
3.1 A working definition 34
3.2 The evolution of SIFs: the development context 35
3.2.1 Trends in vertical SIF evolution: generation models 38
3.2.2 SIFs and risk management 47
3.2.3 Coexistence and trade-offs between generations  53
3.3 Geographical distribution and financial magnitude  54
3.4 Preliminary conclusions 58
4 Social investment funds: operational characteristics, 
strengths and weaknesses  63
4.1 Common operational structure and core features  64
4.1.1 Legal status, institutional structure and procedures 64
4.1.2 Outsourcing of work and co-financing 70
4.1.3 Scope and type of product 73
4.1.4 Specialisation, standardisation, bundling of projects 76
4.1.5 Poverty targeting mechanisms 78
4.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the operational model 80
4.2.1 Strengths 80
4.2.2 Weaknesses and trade-offs  83
5 Potentials, limits and challenges of using social  
investment funds for adaptation finance  88
5.1 Meeting adaptation funding requirements? 90
5.2 Potential political and institutional functions of SIFs  
in adaptation finance 93
5.3 Adaptation-specific challenges for practical  
implementation 95
Bibliography 99
Figures
Figure 1:  International adaptation finance architecture: schematic 
overview of sources, main channels and stakeholders  10
Figure 2:  Evolution of SIFs’ objectives and activities 37
Figure 3:  Regional distribution of SIF projects in the social  
protection portfolio of the World Bank, FY 2000 to 2007 56
Figure 4:  Examples of institutional agency of 29 SIFs  66
Figure 5:  Example of an institutional SIF structure 68
Tables
Table 1:  Core principles of the aid effectiveness agenda 19
Table 2:  Examples of local government involvement in planning, 
financing, implementing SIF-financed activities 42
Table 3:  Trends and characteristics of SIF generations 44
Table 4:  Overview of risks addressed by social funds  
in Latin America  48
Table 5:  Examples of risk management arrangements and  
strategies supported by SIFs 51
Table 6:  Countries with SIFs from the World Bank’s social  
protection portfolio between 1987 and 2007  57
Table 7:  Challenges of implementing social protection measures  
for climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR)  61
Table 8:  SIF investment by type of activity 74
Boxes
Box 1:  General criteria and requirements for channelling  
adaptation finance under the climate regime  14
Box 2:  Comparison and synthesis of climate and development  
financing requirements 22
Box 3:  Different views on country-drivenness and ownership:  
using country systems and (enhanced) direct access  27
Box 4:  General challenges in delivering adaptation finance 30
Box 5:  Delivering adaptation finance: minimum requirements, 
assessment criteria and questions  31
Box 6:  Alignment with national policies through standardisation: 
hexagonal classrooms in Bolivia 77

Abbreviations
AAA Accra Agenda of Action 
AF Adaptation Fund
AFB Adaptation Fund Board
AFR Africa 
AFRICATIP Association Africaine des Agences d’Exécution des Travaux 
d’Intérêt Public
CEO Chief executive officer
CCT Conditional cash transfer
CDD Community-driven development 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
COP Conference of Parties
CSO Civil society organisation
DRR Disaster risk reduction
EAP East Asia and Pacific
ECA Europe and Central Asia
FHIS Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social (Honduras)
FIS Fondo de Inversión Social (Social Investment Fund) (Guatemala) 
FISE Fondo de Inversión Social de Emergencia (Social Investment 
Emergency Fund) (Nicaragua)
FISDL Fondo de Inversión Social para el Desarrollo Local (El Salvador)
FODESAF Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares (Costa 
Rica)
FONCODES Fondo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Social (Cooperation 
Fund for Social Development), formerly Fondo Nacional de 
Compensación y Desarrollo Social (Peru)
FONVIS Fondo de Inversión Social de Venezuela (Venezuela)
FOPAR Fondo Participativo de Inversión Social (Argentina)
FOSIS Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión Social (Chile)
FPS Fondo (Nacional) de Inversión Productiva y Social (Social and 
Productive Investment Fund) (Bolivia)
FSE Fondo Social de Emergencia (Emergency Social Fund) (Bolivia)
FY Financial year
GCF Green Climate Fund
GEF Global Environment Facility
IDA International Development Association
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IFI International finance institution
ILO International Labour Organization
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW Development Bank)
KP Kyoto Protocol
LAC Latin America and Caribbean
LG Local governments
LoCAL facility Local Climate Adaptive Living facility (UNCDF)
MENA Middle East and North Africa
NAMA Nationally appropriate mitigation actions
NAP National adaptation plan
NAPA National adaptation programme of action
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NIE National Implementing Entity
O&M Operation and maintenance
ODA Official development assistance
PAMI Program/  Programa Alimentario Matemo Infantil/ 
RSS  Red de Solidaridad Social (Colombia)
PFM Public financial management
PIU Project implementation unit
PMP Participatory municipal planning
PMU Project management unit
PPCR Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
PRONASOL Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (Mexico)
PRS Poverty reduction strategy
REDLAC Social Network of Latin America and the Caribbean
SAP Structural adjustment programme
SEDESOL Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (Peru)
SIF Social investment fund
UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
ZAMSIF Zambian Social Investment Fund

Providing international adaptation finance for vulnerable communities
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 1
Summary
Context
The provision of (international) finance for adaptation needs in vulnerable 
and local communities is a key element and declared political goal of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and national governments in addressing the adverse effects of climate 
change. Towards that respect, governments need to design effective and 
efficient institutional arrangements that allow the channelling of adaptation 
funds while meeting national and international funding requirements.
At the international level, governments are currently facing a dilemma 
between maximising the use of financing institutions under the climate 
regime on the one hand, and maximising the use of country institutions 
and systems on the other. While both the Adaptation Fund (AF) and 
Green Climate Fund (GFC) under the climate regime are pioneering 
the use of country institutions through their direct access modality, 
their possibilities of maximising the use of country systems are (so far) 
limited in comparison to financing modalities of official development 
assistance (ODA). This might be to the disadvantage of local adaptation 
needs as adaptation finance under the climate regime has been mainly 
distributed on a project-based approach which implies high transaction 
costs, thus disadvantaging small-scale adaptation needs at the local level. 
The targeted allocation of (international) adaptation finance to vulnerable 
communities, small-scale adaptation needs, and to actors at the local 
level is an area that calls for innovation.
Goal and methodology of study
In this context, this study looks at the potential of social investment funds 
(SIFs) in allocating adaptation finance. The potential of using SIFs in 
adaptation finance is discussed on the basis of climate and development 
finance criteria and a review of operational strengths and weaknesses. 
Towards that end, the study provides a brief overview of the international 
adaptation finance architecture, related financing requirements, and 
challenges. It furthermore delineates the evolution, geographical extension 
and financial magnitude of these types of funds along with their operational 
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characteristics and discusses related practical experience and evaluations. 
The analysis is based on a literature review and own work experience.
The potentials, limits, and challenges of using SIFs in adaptation 
finance
The analysis shows that SIFs can be a strong partner for the distribution 
of resources to communities vulnerable to climate change. Social 
investment funds are government-owned institutions which have been 
used by international financial cooperation for more than 20 years. They 
have been established in more than 60 countries and have been used 
to channel high volumes of public money to local level development 
activities (e.g. 60 % of the International Development Association (IDA)’s 
social protection portfolio between 2000 and 2007). In many countries, 
SIFs can, therefore, serve as a learning experience for institutional design 
or, where they still exist, as a potential facility through which to channel 
adaptation finance.
Experience with SIFs in the past indicates that the SIF model is generally 
in a good position to provide targeted investments for small-scale 
adaptation needs in a decentralised and community-driven way. They are 
known for their potential to bundle large numbers of small-scale projects 
at the local level into national programmes, thereby reducing transaction 
costs. Part of the SIF model’s success builds on community participation 
in project selection, design, implementation and management. The 
involvement of local actors and institutions is also a prerequisite for 
successful adaptation processes. Under the SIF model, considerable parts 
of the project cycle are delegated to communities, local governments and/
or the private sector. The actual engagement, related financial potential 
and possible roles of the private sector in adaptation processes and 
finance in distinction to the public sector are so far unclear. Here, SIFs 
offer one possible model for cooperation and engagement.
The SIF model offers a good opportunity for an integrated approach 
to adaptation finance at the policy and institutional level. SIFs could 
particularly play a role at the interface of adaptation to climate change, 
social protection and risk management due to the overlap in goals, 
concepts and approaches. From an institutional perspective, the SIF 
model allows different channels and sources of international and 
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domestic finance to be bundled, integrating them under a common 
institutional and operational roof. However, if seen in the wider context 
of public financial management, the links and degree of integration 
with government institutions and processes are less clear and can imply 
trade-offs. While one strength of SIFs was to pilot and establish new 
procurement models, for example, the lack of integration into public 
financial management systems and the use of country systems has been 
criticised in SIF operations. While the SIF model has been successfully 
adapted to changing government policies in various different national 
contexts over time, coordination with and integration into government 
processes is seen as a main challenge.
In an institutional arrangement of adaptation finance, SIFs can potentially 
take over several political and institutional functions. As shown by past 
practical experience, SIFs successfully took over four basic functions in 
institutional arrangements and in the delivery of resources that overlap 
with important requirements of (international) adaptation finance and/or 
play an important role in adaptation processes as such: i) SIFs have acted 
as engines of local development in supporting vulnerable regions; ii) SIFs 
have acted as laboratories for innovation in delivering investments to the 
ground, at times even inducing wider sector reforms; iii) SIFs have acted 
as promoters of social capital by working in a multi-sectorial way at the 
local level, aiming to support communities in designing and managing 
own project activities and processes; and iv) SIFs have acted as an interim 
solution in times of dysfunctional government institutions or crisis 
situations. SIFs could, therefore, be an interesting financing model for 
the adaptation needs in fragile governance contexts, after climate-related 
disasters or in cases of discrimination of minorities which are highly 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change due to a lack of access to 
social services. The decision on the role and function of SIFs in adaptation 
finance is important because it can influence institutional design options 
and the perspectives on these regarding their strengths and weaknesses.
From an institutional point of view, the main challenge is to maximise 
the use of country systems by integrating an existing SIF into a national 
adaptation financing arrangement or applying key SIF principles to 
similar institutional entities dedicated to adaptation finance. From an 
operational point of view, the overall challenge is to factor in climate 
change-related risks and changes to SIF operations.
Britta Horstmann / Günther Schulz-Heiss
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There are three main approaches and entry points to factor in climate 
change-related risks in the SIF model: i) mainstreaming (or climate-
proofing) climate change adaptation-related risks into existing projects 
(e.g. currently being piloted in Peru); ii) the identification of project 
types and the design of project menus that specifically target adaptation 
needs, and iii) the design of targeting techniques that prioritise people 
and communities highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The 
design of project types and menus is particularly challenging, as the SIF 
model requires a certain degree of standardisation of project activities 
which presupposes a minimum quantity of similar adaptation needs 
across a country with sometimes extremely different climatic conditions 
from region to region. When designing targeting techniques, the lack of 
climate data might constrict the usefulness of an allocation formula that 
links vulnerability indicators with climate or weather data. If weather-
related data, for example, are not comparable or available across regions, 
it might disadvantage regions and communities that are most in need. In 
such a case, an alternative approach could be to focus on indicators for 
adaptive capacity.
The SIF model allows context-specific information and requirements 
to be considered at the project level as it is based on a demand-driven 
approach in project selection and allows for modifications in project 
design. However, it is not the best choice for very small- or very large-
scale investments in terms of financial volume or in terms of particular 
adaptation needs because these are highly context-dependent, not 
repeatable, or cannot be standardised to a certain extent. The suitability of 
the SIF model for adaptation finance presupposes that a certain minimum 
of communities share the same adaptation needs and therefore require 
the same, or similar, type of goods or services.
Outlook
Towards an application of the SIF model in adaptation finance in practice, 
country-specific analysis as well as an updated overview on its current 
use by international financing institutions and partners would be useful. 
Particularly an analysis of SIFs in the area of risk management merits 
further attention.
Providing international adaptation finance for vulnerable communities
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1 Introduction
The provision of international climate finance for adaptation needs in local 
and vulnerable communities currently faces a dilemma: while developing 
countries in particular stress that adaptation finance should serve the 
vulnerable, that it should be additional to official development assistance 
(ODA) and that it should thus not be distributed by the established institutions 
and modalities of ODA but rather by institutions under the governance of the 
climate regime and by country-based institutions, the dedicated and newly 
established funds that have been set up under the climate regime to address 
these claims are currently of a disadvantage to small-scale adaptation needs 
of vulnerable communities as regards access possibilities.
So far, adaptation finance under the climate regime has mainly been 
distributed on a project-based approach which implies relatively high 
transaction costs for small-scale adaptation needs. And many – not all – 
of the adaptation needs of vulnerable communities at the local level are 
small in terms of financial volume. While the direct access modality of 
the Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund allow the use of country 
institutions and systems, the Funds’ possibilities to maximise the use of 
these are (so far) limited in comparison to official development assistance, 
which can even channel climate finance through general budget support. 
National governments are currently facing the challenge of merging 
different interests and requirements into effective and efficient institutional 
arrangements that allow adaptation funds to be channelled while meeting 
national and international financing requirements.
In this context, this study looks at the potential of social investment funds 
(SIFs) in allocating adaptation finance to vulnerable communities. Social 
investment funds are known for their potential to bundle a large number 
of small-scale projects at the local level into national programmes, thereby 
reducing transaction costs. They are government-owned institutions which 
have been used by the international financial cooperation for more than 20 
years and have been designed to promote a decentralised and community-
driven investment approach, often targeted at disadvantaged and vulnerable 
groups.1 Awarding responsibilities in project planning and implementation 
1 Throughout this study, we will use the term ‘community’ for a social group and the 
locality they live in, whereas we refer to ‘local governments’ as the lowest administrative 
or governing body of a country’s public governance system.
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to communities and the private sector is one of their key characteristics. 
Social investment funds have been established in more than 60 countries 
and in many still form part of the institutional landscape.
The potential use of SIFs: motivation and limits of study
To support the goal of delivering adaptation funds to vulnerable communities, 
this study first and foremost looks at SIFs as institutions that channel finance 
from various sources and not as institutions that directly access adaptation 
finance under the Adaptation Fund or respectively the Green Climate Fund 
(despite this being a possible scenario of how SIFs could be used).
The study is motivated by an interest in using existing institutions to 
the extent possible and in introducing innovations where necessary for 
devolving funds and responsibilities to local actors. We believe that the 
targeted allocation of adaptation finance to vulnerable communities, to 
small-scale adaptation needs, and to actors at the local level is still an area 
that needs innovation. Exploring the potential of SIFs in this context is a 
goal of this study. With regard to the dilemma outlined above, the delivery 
of international adaptation finance through the SIF model might provide a 
solution for certain types of adaptation activities. So far, little experience 
has been gathered on how national institutions with direct access to 
international climate funds can devolve funds (and responsibilities) to the 
sub-national level. 
Furthermore, the authors would like to underline that this study does not 
intend to recommend social investment funds for the delivery of adaptation 
finance in general. The intention is to provide an overview of the subject 
and to spur on the debate concerning their potential use, strengths and 
weaknesses. The application of a SIF model to adaptation finance in a 
country context always requires a country-specific analysis. For this reason, 
the analysis also does not look at the institutional arrangements needed 
between national institutions with direct access and SIFs.
Overview of the study
The study evaluates the potential of SIFs on the basis of climate and 
development finance criteria and a review of their operational strengths 
and weaknesses, which is based on practical experience with these types of 
funds. To this end, Section 2 provides a brief overview of the international 
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adaptation finance architecture, and characterises the main challenges and 
criteria that an institutional arrangement should meet from an international 
climate-finance and development-effectiveness perspective. These two 
perspectives are then merged into a set of international minimum adaptation 
finance criteria and requirements.
Based on a literature review and own work experience with social 
investment funds (Schulz-Heiss 2011), Section 3 delineates the evolution of 
SIFs, as well as their geographical distribution and financial magnitude. An 
overview of the evolution and changing nature of SIFs over time provides a 
better understanding of their strengths and weaknesses as these also have to 
be understood in the context of changing policy needs and contexts. Based 
on evidence and analysis provided in the literature, Section 4 characterises 
general operational characteristics in country contexts and analyses-
related strength and weaknesses. Against the background of the minimum 
requirements in international adaptation finance delineated in Section 2 as 
well as based on practical experience in channelling development finance 
through SIFs (Sections 3 and 4), Section 5 discusses the potential, limits and 
challenges of using SIFs for channelling adaptation finance to vulnerable 
communities.
2 Delivering adaptation finance: architecture, 
requirements and challenges 
Past discussions on the strengths and weaknesses of SIFs over time have 
shown that their evaluation is always also a matter of political perspectives 
and requirements. An evaluation of the potential, limits and challenges of 
using SIFs for channelling adaptation finance in general and international 
adaptation finance in particular therefore requires a brief description 
of the current political context. Towards that end, this section aims to 
briefly illustrate the current requirements and challenges that decision-
makers in the field of climate change finance are facing when considering 
setting up institutional structures for the delivery of finance for climate 
change adaptation purposes. With regard to the dilemma illustrated in 
the Introduction, finding an integrated approach between climate and 
development finance is certainly one of the main challenges.
Questions related to the institutional design and governance of delivering 
adaptation finance have come to the forefront in recent years in contrast to a 
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focus on the amount of available funding in the first decade of international 
climate negotiations. One reason for this is that many governments see the 
need to support climate change adaptation activities in a targeted way. A 
second reason is the prospect of additional international adaptation funds 
and the demand for an effective, fair and transparent distribution of these 
funds. Another major reason is the increased number of actors providing 
adaptation-related funding2 and related problems caused by fragmentation.3 
The institutional landscape that relates to the delivery of adaptation finance 
has become increasingly complex over the past years. 
Understanding the dynamics of this international institutional landscape and 
related financing requirements also helps to promote a better understanding 
of the kind of institutional structure needed in national contexts. Towards a 
transparent assessment of SIFs, the delineation of adaptation funding criteria 
and requirements at the same time serves to explain part of the ground on 
which our assessment in the final section is based. 
2.1 Adaptation finance architecture: a brief overview
At the present time there are a multitude of institutions providing financial 
support for adaptation activities in developing countries (see Figure 1). For 
the implementation of financial commitments under the mandate of the 
UNFCCC, parties can use the financial mechanism of the Convention, the 
Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol or bilateral, regional, or other 
multilateral channels (UNFCCC, Article 11.5). The bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral channels used are often institutions that also channel official 
development assistance (ODA; see arrows (Figure 1) for possible channels). 
The operating entities of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC are 
currently the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate 
Fund (GCF). The GCF is still in the process of being set up while the 
Adaptation Fund works under the guidance of Kyoto Protocol parties and is 
operated by the Adaptation Fund Board which received its own legal capacity 
in 2011 in Germany. The fund is currently financed by the carbon market and 
2 See e.g. UNFCCC’s adaptation funding interface, http://unfccc.int/adaptation/
implementing_adaptation/adaptation_funding_interface/items/4638.php; or http://www.
climatefundsupdate.org).
3 For a brief explanation of challenges related to fragmentation see e.g. World Bank 2010, 
263f.
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channels a share of proceeds from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
revenues and voluntary donations. In the second commitment period from 
January 2013 to 2020, the fund shall also receive a share of proceeds levied 
on transfers or issuance of certificates from the other Kyoto Protocol carbon 
market mechanisms (Decision 1/CMP. 8).
Under the UNFCCC, there are three basic modalities of accessing or 
delivering international adaptation finance:
 • Direct access through an accredited national institution i) to the 
Adaptation Fund (National Implementing Entity); ii) to the GEF for 
reporting activities; and iii) to the Green Climate Fund once fully 
operationalised (see dotted arrow Figure 1).
 • Indirect access through a multilateral institution which is accredited i) to 
the Adaptation Fund (Multilateral Implementing Entity), and/or b) to the 
GEF (Implementing Agency).
 • Bilateral, regional, and multilateral channels.
Apart from institutions of the climate regime and ODA, adaptation finance 
in developing countries can also be provided through own domestic budgets 
or through other developing countries (non-Annex I countries; South-South 
cooperation), the private sector or international and national civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and foundations. These actors can at the same time 
administer or deliver adaptation funds from own or other sources (see Figure 
1). The role of CSOs and the private sector for the delivery of adaptation 
funds varies, and depends on national practice and the question of to what 
extent laws and regulations allow or incentivise their engagement (see 
dotted arrow Figure 1).
Although the climate regime is perceived by many to be the only legitimate 
framework for the delivery of international adaptation finance, a large 
share of adaptation funding is being delivered by institutions in the context 
of official development assistance (ODA). In terms of volume, it can be 
assumed that the major share of adaptation finance in developing countries 
is public money in form of ODA, channelled by the public institutions of 
ODA. This has been shown via the estimates and calculations of available 
adaptation funds (e.g. Persson et al. 2009, 112) and becomes obvious when 
looking at the funding volume of initiatives like the Climate Investment 
Facility of the World Bank (e.g. www.climatefundsupdate.org; Schalatek et 
al. 2012).
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The Green Climate Fund is expected to channel a “significant share of 
new multilateral funding for adaptation” (Decision 1/CP.16 Paragraph 
100, in FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1). However, the extent to which the share 
of adaptation finance under the Climate Convention will significantly 
increase in the future is currently unclear, particularly given the collapse 
of the carbon market that is considered to be an important future funding 
source under the climate regime and currently finances the Adaptation 
Fund and Germany’s International Climate Initiative. If donors cap their 
contribution to multilateral channels, bilateral financing institutions could 
even become the largest source of international public climate change 
finance in the coming years (Glemarec et al. 2011, 76). Currently, there 
is no comprehensive analysis of the volume of adaptation finance coming 
from, or being channelled through, the private sector, charity organisations 
or research, national and international consultants.
Figure 1:  International adaptation finance architecture: schematic overview 
of sources, main channels and stakeholders  
Financing sources
Total available adaptation finance 
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Sources: Graph modified based on own research and Persson et al. 2009, 165; 
Glemarec et al. 2011, 63; www.climatefundsupdate.org; Buchner et al. 
2011
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The multitude of different institutions and the importance of development 
assistance for adaptation finance illustrate that the creation of synergies 
between development and climate finance is a key challenge for establishing 
efficient and effective funding arrangements for the delivery of adaptation 
finance. This challenge has an international and national dimension. It 
also illustrates that the design of adaptation governance and institutions in 
developing countries is particularly decisive for the delivery of adaptation 
funds. Governments in developing countries face the difficult challenge 
of bundling and coordinating various funding flows and institutional 
modalities, and aligning them with national development plans. 
A brief analysis of the adaptation finance architecture also shows that the 
question of how best to design national institutional structures for delivering 
international adaptation finance for local adaptation activities is embedded 
in international funding requirements under the climate regime as well as in 
a general development context, one which is to different degrees determined 
by requirements of official bi- and multilateral development cooperation. 
For this reason, the following sections highlight the main requirements in 
terms of goals and criteria that an institutional arrangement has to meet from 
a climate change perspective (Sub-section 2.2) and from a development 
perspective (Sub-section 2.3). 
As it is not possible to consider the specific circumstances of public financial 
management in particular developing countries within the scope of this study, 
the description of the main challenges and funding requirements in the field 
of development finance is based on the international aid or development-
effectiveness agenda. This agenda was reaffirmed by 160 countries and 
52 international organisations in December 2011 as a result of the fourth 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (“Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation”). It is the main global agenda which aims at 
improving the delivery and management of financial resources between 
donor and recipient countries, based on past and current experiences in 
development cooperation.
2.2 Climate change financing requirements
At the UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries agreed 
to scale up funding for the implementation of adaptation actions in developing 
countries and to improve access to these financial resources (Copenhagen 
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Accord, Paragraphs 3 and 8). With the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun 
Agreement in 2010, they committed to mobilising USD 100 billion annually 
by 2020, of which a share was to be used to support adaptation activities 
in developing countries. These funds “may come from a variety of sources, 
public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources” 
(Decision 1/CP.16, Paragraph 99, in FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1). The goal is to 
deliver these new funds for adaptation “through effective and efficient fund 
arrangements” (Copenhagen Accord, Paragraph 8). 
Under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries have 
committed to providing new and additional financial resources to assist 
developing country parties to adapt to climate change and meet related costs 
(UNFCCC, Art. 4.3, 4.4; Kyoto Protocol (KP), Art. 11.2, Art. 12.8). These 
costs may be incurred for example in connection with the formulation, 
implementation and publishing of national programmes and measures to 
facilitate adequate adaptation in a country (UNFCCC, Art. 4.1(b)). The 
arrangement indicates that funds provided for related tasks should be 
adequate and predictable in their flow (UNFCCC, Art. 4.3, KP, Art. 11.2; 
Decision 1/CP.16, Paragraph 97). In the case of the Green Climate Fund, 
developed countries have agreed to promote a balanced allocation of funds 
for mitigation and adaptation activities (Decision 3/CP.17, Paragraph 8). 
Funding under the Convention should not only support the implementation 
of the Convention, but should also contribute to the achievement of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development and the Millennium Development 
Goals, and contribute to the integration of climate change considerations 
into development activities (see e.g. Decisions 5/CP.9 and 6/CP.9).
When it comes to the distribution of these funds for particular adaptation 
activities, the climate regime highlights general criteria and requirements 
that should be met by an institutional arrangement under the mandate of 
the climate regime as listed in Box 1.4 Beyond these general criteria, the 
GEF, the Adaptation Fund, and the Green Climate Fund have more specific 
requirements in place that can vary. These usually specify and detail the 
listed funding requirements and, where applicable and of importance for 
the institutional design in delivering funds, these requirements are briefly 
indicated in Box 1.
4 Past and future guidance given to the operating entity of the financial mechanism of the 
Convention shall apply mutatis mutandis to the Kyoto Protocol (KP, Art. 11.2).
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If countries choose to access international adaptation finance directly 
through a national institution (see Figure 1), the institution has to meet 
international fiduciary standards. These international standards exist for the 
Adaptation Fund5 so far and will most likely be set up in a similar form for 
the direct access modality of the Green Climate Fund. As this study only 
provides a general overview of SIFs, these standards are not relevant for 
this analysis. They can, however, be relevant in a country-specific analysis 
of SIFs.6
Parties reconfirmed the general requirements listed in Box 1 for the delivery 
of climate finance in decisions at the Conference of Parties (COP) in 
Cancun and Durban on the Green Climate Fund (Decision 3/CP.17/Annex 
Governing Instrument for the Green Climate Fund, Paragraphs 2 and 3). 
This includes the objective that climate finance in the light of sustainable 
development shall also “promote environmental, social, economic and 
development co-benefits” (Decision 3/CP.17/Annex Governing Instrument 
for the Green Climate Fund, Paragraph 3). The Green Climate Fund is still 
in the design stage, however its Governing Instrument, which includes the 
objectives and guiding principles of the Fund, has already been approved at 
COP 17 in Durban.
Beyond the adaptation requirements listed in Box 1, additional central goals 
and guiding principles of the Green Climate Fund will be to “catalyse” public 
and private finance at the national and international level, and to “strengthen 
engagement at the country level through the effective involvement of relevant 
institutions and stakeholders”, taking a “gender sensitive approach”. The 
GCF shall strive to maximise impacts and a “results-based approach” 
will be an important criterion for allocating resources (for all previous 
quotations, see Decision 3/CP.17/Annex Governing Instrument for the 
Green Climate Fund, Paragraphs 3 and 51. While the requirement of having 
5 See accreditation process at www.adaptation-fund.org.
6 There are two scenarios: first, they are directly relevant if a national institution applies 
for direct access. In theory, this is a possible role for a social investment fund if the fund 
under discussion has the respective legal and institutional status in a country. Second, 
the fiduciary standards can be relevant in a detailed analysis (e.g. feasibility study) at 
the country level as to whether the respective institution or fund (here SIFs) qualifies 
for delivering adaptation funds as a subordinated institution to the institution with direct 
access. The rationale behind such an assessment would be that the national institution 
with direct access can more easily adhere to international fiduciary standards if the 
subordinated institutions in the delivery chain do so as well.
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a results-oriented framework in place is not specified in the convention text 
or Kyoto Protocol, it is detailed in GEF documents for the Least Developed 
Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund, and was introduced by 
the Adaptation Fund Board at its 10th meeting.7 The Green Climate Fund 
may even apply a results-based financing approach (Governing Instrument 
for the Green Climate Fund, Para 55).8
7 For the GEF, see for example GEF 2008, GEF 2010; for the Adaptation Fund see for 
example the “Results Framework and Baseline Guidance: Project-level” at https://www.
adaptation-fund.org/sites/default/files/Results%20Framework%20and%20Baseline%20
Guidance%20final%20compressed.pdf.
8 For an explanation of the difference between results-based management and results-based 
financing, see for instance Klingebiel 2012.
Box 1:  General criteria and requirements for channelling 
adaptation finance under the climate regime 
1. Target the vulnerable: The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol both 
aim to support those countries that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change (UNFCCC, Preamble, Art. 3.2, Art. 
4.4, Art. 4.9; KP, Art. 12.8, AF, Strategic Priorities and Guidelines, Art. 
5(a)). Beyond the support of vulnerable countries, the Adaptation Fund 
has the strategic priority that countries shall give particular attention to 
the needs of the most vulnerable communities (AF, Strategic Priorities, 
Policies and Guidelines, Art. 8). In general, funding under the Adaptation 
Fund can be made available for national, regional and community-level 
activities (Decision 5/CMP.2, Paragraph 2). The Green Climate Fund 
intends to design its access modalities in a way that encourages the 
active involvement of relevant stakeholders, including vulnerable groups 
(Decision 3/CP.17/Annex Governing Instrument for the Green Climate 
Fund, Paragraph 31). As a shared vision for long-term cooperative action, 
parties at the conference in Cancun also recognised subnational and local 
governments as important stakeholders (Decision 1/16 (7)). 
2. Cost-effectiveness and efficiency: The UNFCCC adopts a catalytic 
and synergetic role, including its financial mechanism. Policies and 
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective to achieve 
global benefits at the lowest possible costs (UNFCCC, Art. 3.3) and 
consistency between climate change-related activities should be sought 
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with those undertaken outside the framework of the financial mechanism 
(Decision 11/CP.1). 
3. Country-drivenness: The UNFCCC reaffirms the principle of 
sovereignty (UNFCCC, Preamble). Climate change-related activities 
should be “appropriate for the specific conditions” of each country, 
respecting the need for economic development (UNFCCC, Art. 3.4). 
Impact assessments, for example, should be formulated and determined 
nationally (UNFCCC, Art. 4.1(f)).
The Adaptation Fund is more explicit on this criterion, saying in its 
Strategic Priorities, Policies and Guidelines that adaptation projects 
and programmes that will be financed need to be based on the needs, 
views and priorities of the respective country (Paragraph 5(b); see also 
Decision 28/CMP.1). The criterion of country-drivenness is also reflected 
in the institutional access modality of the Adaptation Fund and the Green 
Climate Fund that allow developing countries to access resources through 
accredited national institutions (Decision CMP 1/.3, Paragraph 29; 
Decision 3/CP.17/Annex Governing Instrument for the Green Climate 
Fund, para 31). 
A “country-driven approach is also a core principle to build the business 
model” of the Green Climate Fund (Decision B.01-13/06, Paragraph 
(c)(i)), including its private sector facility (Decision 3/CP.17/Annex 
Governing Instrument for the Green Climate Fund, Paragraph 42). 
4. Promoting an integrated approach: In line with the principle of 
country-drivenness, measures undertaken under the Convention should 
be in line with sustainable development and be integrated with national 
development programmes (UNFCCC, Art. 3.4; see also Adaptation 
Fund, Strategic Priorities, Policies and Guidelines of the Adaptation 
Fund, Paragraph 6). In order to achieve complementarity and coherence 
between activities of other funds under the Convention and other funds 
and channels, the Green Climate Fund “will promote coherence in 
programming at the national level through appropriate mechanisms” 
(Decision 3/CP.17/Annex Governing Instrument for the Green Climate 
Fund, Paragraph 34).
The promotion of an integrated approach under the Convention is 
foremost a goal at the policy level. To what extent this goal is being 
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extended to the institutional level is not clear yet. In the Governing 
Instrument of the Green Climate Fund, parties state that the “Fund shall 
operate in the context of appropriate arrangements between itself and 
other existing funds” and that the “Fund will also initiate discussions 
on coherence in climate finance delivery with other relevant multilateral 
entities” (Decision 3/CP.17/Annex Governing Instrument for the Green 
Climate Fund, Paragraphs 33–34). 
5. Context specific: Policies and measures should take into account 
different socio-economic contexts (UNFCCC Art. 3.3).
6. Full cost and co-financing: The financial mechanism provides 
financial resources on a grant or concessional basis (UNFCCC, Art. 
11.1). Parties to the Convention commit to refund the “agreed full costs” 
for activities such as reporting and the “agreed full incremental costs” 
(or additional costs) for the implementation of adaptation activities. In 
the latter case, co-financing by the implementing country is necessary. 
The Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto Protocol pays the “agreed full costs” 
incurred by developing countries in implementing their commitments 
under the Convention (KP, Art. 11.2(a)). The Green Climate Fund 
supports adaptation activities on the basis of “agreed full and agreed 
incremental costs” and can also provide support for capacity building 
and preparatory activities that enable countries to access funding 
(Decision 3/CP.17/Annex Governing Instrument for the Green Climate 
Fund, Paragraphs 35, 38 and 40).
7. Transparency: “The financial mechanism shall have an equitable 
and balanced representation of all Parties within a transparent 
system of governance” (UNFCCC, Art. 11.2; see also Decision 1/
CMP.3, Paragraph 17). While the Convention text is limited to the 
system of governance, parties to the Convention explicitly extended 
the transparency requirement for the Green Climate Fund to the entire 
funding operations or particular related aspects (Decision 3/CP.17/
Annex Governing Instrument for the Green Climate Fund, Paragraph 
3; Decision 2/CP.4, Paragraph 3(c); Decision 5/CMP.2, Paragraph 1(c)). 
The Adaptation Fund at its 21st meeting approved an open information 
policy (see AFB/EFC.12/.5/Rev.1).
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2.3 Development financing requirements
The delivery and management of financial resources from developed to 
developing countries have received a lot of attention on the international aid 
agenda in the past years. A main reason for this was the criticism voiced by 
various actors that aid was ineffective, thereby undermining the legitimacy of 
development policy and development cooperation (see Ashoff 2010, 29–38). 
One of the main problems development cooperation is facing is the multitude 
of existing and the still increasing number of actors. Currently there are around 
40 bilateral and 30 multilateral donors, each with various sub-organisations, 
often with their own goals, institutional interests and processes (Ashoff 2010, 
48). This fragmentation of aid impairs aid effectiveness and efficiency as it 
leads to increased transaction costs and may weaken a country’s ownership of 
development activities and may burden already limited institutional capacities 
(e.g. OECD 2008, 11; Acharya / De Lima / Moore 2006). With the goal of 
addressing these problems of aid delivery and management, developing and 
developed countries endorsed several main declarations and documents on 
aid effectiveness, milestones being the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
in 2005 (OECD 2005), the Accra Agenda of Action in 2008, and the Busan 
declaration on effective development co-operation in 2011.
The basis of the aid effectiveness agenda is the Paris Declaration, in which 
developed and developing countries agreed to improve effectiveness 
particularly by:
 • “strengthening partner countries’ national development strategies and 
operational frameworks”,
 • “increasing alignment with a countries’ priorities, systems and 
procedures,” 
 • ‘increasing accountability of donors and partner countries to their 
citizens’,
 • ‘eliminating duplication and operating as cost-effective as possible’,
 • “reforming and simplifying donor policies and procedures” and
 • by “[d]efining measures and standards of performance and accountability 
of partner country systems in public financial management, procurement, 
fiduciary safeguards and environmental assessments” (Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness, Article 3).
Britta Horstmann / Günther Schulz-Heiss
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)18
Five key principles form the basis of the reform agenda: ownership; 
alignment; harmonisation; managing for results; and mutual accountability, 
which are detailed by respective indicators that allow for the monitoring and 
evaluation of progress (see Table 1).
With the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), countries consolidated the 
principles of the Paris Declaration and specified or added aspects, for 
example, in the field of gender (AAA, Paragraphs 3, 13, 42); transparency 
(AAA, Paragraph 22, 24a); or the role of international funds that should 
support country ownership and align and harmonise their assistance 
proactively with national contexts (AAA, Paragraph 9, 16, 19c; compare 
World Bank 2011, vii, 2). “As new global challenges emerge donors will 
ensure that existing channels for aid delivery are used and, if necessary, 
strengthened before creating separate new channels that risk further 
fragmentation and complicate co-ordination at country level” (AAA, 
Paragraph 19c).
The outcome document at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
in Busan basically reconfirms the commitments made in Paris and Accra 
and aims to broaden the scope of the agenda by including new actors (see 
Busan Declaration, Paragraph 14) such as emerging donors like China, 
India, Brazil, or Russia (see also Paragraph 30), civil society organisations 
or the private sector (Paragraph 32) and by putting “aid effectiveness” in 
the context of “development effectiveness” (Paragraphs 28-34) whereby 
aid is seen as only one way to catalyse development (Busan Declaration, 
Paragraph 28; “from aid to development effectiveness”).9
The Busan outcome document, called the “Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation”, also highlights the particular challenges that 
potential substantial climate change resource flows between countries might 
imply. Against this background, the signatories intend “to support national 
climate change policies and planning as an integral part of developing 
countries’ overall national development plans” and want to “ensure that 
where appropriate these measures are financed, delivered and monitored 
through developing countries’ systems in a transparent manner” (Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, Paragraph 34 (a)).
9 For further information on the Forum, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/
fourthhighlevelforumonaideffectiveness.htm.
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Although the Busan Document is not binding it is being endorsed by 160 
countries and 52 international organisations. The aid-effectiveness process 
had been driven by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, a multi-
stakeholder group consisting of developing and developed countries, South-
South co-operation providers, and civil society organisations. Since mid-
2012, the “Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation” has 
taken over and has the mandate to support the implementation of the Busan 
agreement.10
Table 1: Core principles of the aid effectiveness agenda
Principles Indicators
1. Ownership
Partner countries exercise 
effective leadership over their 
development policies and 
strategies, and coordinate 
development actions.
1. Partners have operational development 
strategies: Number of countries with national 
development strategies (including PRSs 
(Poverty Reduction Strategies)) that have clear 
strategic priorities linked to a medium-term 
expenditure framework and reflected in annual 
budgets.
2. Alignment
Donors base their overall 
support on partner countries’ 
national development 
strategies, institutions and 
procedures.
2. Reliable country systems: 
Number of partner countries that have 
procurement and public financial management 
systems that either a) adhere to broadly 
accepted good practices, or b) have a reform 
programme in place to achieve these.
3. Aid flows are aligned on national priorities: 
Percent of aid flows to the government sector 
that is reported on partners’ national budgets.
4. Strengthen capacity by coordinated support: 
Percent of donor capacity-development 
support provided through coordinated 
programmes consistent with partners’ national 
development strategies.
10 For details on the mandate and steering process of the “Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation” see http://www.undp.org/content/dam/uspc/docs/Mandate_
of_the_Global_Partnership_for_Effective_Development_Co-operation.pdf. 
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Table 1 (cont.): Core principles of the aid effectiveness agenda
Principles Indicators
5a. Use of country public financial 
management systems: Percent of donors and of 
aid flows that use public financial management 
systems in partner countries, which either a) 
adhere to broadly accepted good practices 
or b) have a reform programme in place to 
achieve these.
5b. Use of country procurement systems: 
Percent of donors and of aid flows that use 
partner country procurement systems which 
either a) adhere to broadly accepted good 
practices or b) have a reform programme in 
place to achieve these.
6. Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel 
implementation structures:
Number of parallel project implementation 
units (PIUs) per country.
7. Aid is more predictable: 
Percent of aid disbursements released 
according to agreed schedules in annual or 
multi-year frameworks.
8. Aid is untied: 
Percent of bilateral aid that is untied.
3. Harmonisation
Donors’ actions are more 
harmonised, transparent and 
collectively effective.
9. Use of common arrangements or 
procedures: 
Percent of aid provided as programme-based 
approaches.
10. Encourage shared analysis: 
Percent of a) field missions and/or b) country 
analytic work, including diagnostic reviews 
that are joint.
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Table 1 (cont.): Core principles of the aid effectiveness agenda
Principles Indicators
4. Managing for results
Managing resources and 
improving decision-making 
for results.
11. Results-oriented frameworks: 
Number of countries with transparent 
and monitorable performance assessment 
frameworks to assess progress against a) the 
national development strategies and b) sector 
programmes.
5. Mutual accountability
Donors and partners are 
accountable for development 
results.
12. Mutual accountability: 
Number of partner countries that undertake 
mutual assessments of progress in 
implementing agreed commitments on 
aid effectiveness including those in this 
Declaration.
Notes: Methodological annotations  
The term ‘partner countries’ in the list of indicators usually refers to 
those countries that receive aid, see e.g. indicators under the principle 
of ‘alignment’. However, under Indicator 12, the term includes both 
signatories to the aid-effectiveness agenda, donor and recipient 
countries.
Source: OECD, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectivenes
2.4 Common challenges and assessment criteria
The agreed funding criteria under the climate change and development 
agenda show that these two agendas share common political objectives 
in finding an appropriate mode of delivering finance, a central one being 
a country-driven and integrated approach at the national level where 
countries have ownership over their development and adaptation policies. 
Box 2 provides a brief comparative overview between the financing 
requirements of the two agendas which illustrates commonalities as well 
as differences.
Britta Horstmann / Günther Schulz-Heiss
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)22
Box 2:  Comparison and synthesis of climate and development 
financing requirements
Synthesis funding 
criteria*
Climate Change 
Regime*
Development Effectiveness 
Agenda 
(Paris Declaration)
Full cost and  
co-financing
New and 
additional finance
Adequate, 
predictable, 
sustainable finance
Indicator 7: Aid is more 
predictable (alignment)
Cost-effectiveness 
and efficiency
Cost-effectiveness 
and efficiency 
Whole aid effectiveness 
agenda aims at improving cost-
effectiveness and efficiency
Support particularly 
vulnerable countries, 
communities, and 
groups 
Support 
particularly 
vulnerable 
countries, 
communities and 
groups
Country-driven 
(excluding  
Indicator 1)
Country-driven Ownership: Effective leadership 
by partner countries over 
development policies and 
strategies 
Country-driven/ 
integrated approach
Indicator 3
Indicator 42
Indicator 5a
Indicator 5b
Integrated 
approach
Indicator 3: Percent of aid flows 
reported on partners national 
budgets 
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Synthesis funding 
criteria*
Climate Change 
Regime*
Development Effectiveness 
Agenda 
(Paris Declaration)
Indicator 4: Capacity 
development support (technical 
assistance) provided through 
coordinated programmes 
consistent with partners’ national 
development strategies
Indicator 5a: Use of partner 
country public financial 
management systems
Indicator 5b: Use of partner 
country procurement systems
Coordinated 
approach3
Pooling of funds
Indicator 6
Indicator 4
Finance can 
come from a 
multitude of 
sources/ funding 
arrangement can 
channel funds 
from a multitude 
of sources
Common practice and challenge 
that the Aid Effectiveness 
Agenda aims to address:
Indicator 4: Capacity 
development support  
(technical cooperation) 
provided through co-ordinated 
programmes [...]
Indicator 6: Avoid parallel 
implementation structures
Programme-based 
approach
- Indicator 9: Percentage of aid 
provided as programme-based 
approaches
Encourages  
shared analysis 
(Indicator 10)
- Indicator 10: Encourage shared 
analysis (harmonisation) 
Context specific Context specific
Catalytic 
approach1
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Synthesis funding 
criteria*
Climate Change 
Regime*
Development Effectiveness 
Agenda
(Paris Declaration)
Gender sensitive1 Gender-sensitive1 AAA (Paragraphs 3, 13, 42)
Results-based 
approach1
Results-based 
approach1
Indicator 11: Results-oriented 
frameworks in place 
Transparency
Indicator 11
transparency Indicator 2: Procurement and 
public fi nancial management 
systems in place
Indicator 11: Results-oriented/ 
transparent and monitorable 
performance assessment 
frameworks in place to assess 
progress against national 
development strategies and sector 
programmes
- - Indicator 12: Mutual 
accountability
Notes: Methodological annotations
* Text in italics: criteria are not listed in UNFCCC or KP text; see Sub-section 2.2 for 
references and explanations or see the column on aid effectiveness; 
1  Explicit target/principle of the GCF
2  Indicator 4 is only partly covered by the Convention namely with regard to 
“consistency with national development strategies”; not covered is the goal by the 
development effectiveness agenda that “50% of technical co-operation fl ows are 
implemented” through “co-ordinated programmes”.
3  The requirement that a funding arrangement needs to channel funds from a multitude 
of sources is subsumed under the criterion of coordination, as the pooling of funds 
from various sources can be one way of coordination.
The list of common adaptation fi nancing criteria for this study does not include: 
 • Indicator 1 of the aid effectiveness agenda: while the principle of ownership is generally 
refl ected in the principle of “country-drivenness” or “integrated approach”, Indicator 1 is 
currently not an adaptation fi nancing requirement under the climate regime.
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 • Indicator 2 of the aid effectiveness agenda: the commitment behind this indicator is 
to “Work together to establish mutually agreed frameworks that provide reliable 
assessments of performance, transparency and accountability of country systems”. This 
commitment aims at the country-level and not at the mode of delivery at a fund level; 
therefore, similar indicators 5a and 5b are used in this analysis.
 • Indicator 5b: is of relevance for the direct access modality only.
 • The following criteria are not included as these primarily refer to the availability of 
finance for partner countries and not to the design of delivery: full cost and co-financing, 
additionality, adequate, predictable, sustainable finance (compare also Indicator 7 of the 
aid effectiveness agenda), and Indicator 8 (untied aid);
 • Indicator 10 of the aid effectiveness agenda: this is not a relevant criterion for the quality 
of delivering finance
 • Indicator 12 of the aid effectiveness agenda: the principle of mutual accountability refers 
to the assessment of progress in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda only
 • Catalytic approach: the meaning of this criterion is not specified under the climate regime
Despite common goals, there are also tensions between the two agendas. 
Looking at the current task of designing an appropriate (national) institutional 
structure for delivering adaptation finance, two major challenges emerge, 
when comparing the political target course and discourse of these agendas 
with practical implementation. One is the maximisation of using country 
systems and institutions; the other is the design of institutional structures 
that are targeted at the support of vulnerable communities and allow funds 
to be channelled for small-scale adaptation needs and to the local level.
2.4.1 Maximising the use of country systems and institutions 
in adaptation finance
The use of country systems and institutions to the extent possible is a 
central goal of the development effectiveness agenda in order to increase 
effectiveness and efficiency in the use of funds and in order to decrease 
institutional fragmentation. So far, climate negotiations and decisions 
under the climate regime have led to a proliferation of climate-related 
funds and more institutional fragmentation. One political reason for 
the proliferation of climate funds is that developing countries have 
demanded that any adaptation funds must be new and additional to official 
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development assistance (ODA) to avoid undermining other important tasks 
of development cooperation and because of the historical responsibility of 
developed countries in causing climate change. Along with this, developing 
countries and other actors do not regard adaptation finance as aid, and 
therefore claim that adaptation finance should not be subject to conditions 
of ODA and modes of delivery.
This perspective on adaptation finance contributed to further fragmentation 
in the landscape of adaptation financing institutions, inside and outside 
the mandate of the climate regime. Under the climate regime it led to 
the creation of two additional funds, the Adaptation Fund and the Green 
Climate Fund. Paradoxically, these two additional funds at the same time 
are innovative and have the potential to support the implementation of the 
development-effectiveness agenda through their direct access modality that 
pursues the use of country institutions. The direct access modality allows 
countries to directly access international climate adaptation finance through 
accredited national institutions.11 However, as illustrated in more detail in 
Box 3, the current possibilities of using country systems are much higher 
under the conditions and modalities of ODA than under the current financing 
modalities of the climate regime. From the perspective of implementing 
a country-driven and integrated approach, maximising the use of country 
systems and institutions in international adaptation finance is therefore still 
a challenge.
11 The Adaptation Fund is regarded as innovative for its independence of ODA sources: it 
has a majority of developing countries in its governing board and it allows developing 
countries to directly access international funds (Horstmann / Chandani-Abeysinghe 2011). 
The Green Climate Fund will also have a direct access modality for national institutions. 
Usually, countries rely on one of the multilateral institutions to access international funds. 
An example of direct access in the field of development finance is The Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 
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Box 3:  Different views on country-drivenness and ownership: using 
country systems and (enhanced) direct access 
The objectives of the direct access modality of the Adaptation Fund and 
Green Climate Fund relate to the principle of country-drivenness and 
the implementation of an integrated funding approach under the climate 
regime. Under the aid effectiveness agenda, the direct access modality 
would fall under the requirement of ownership (except Indicator 1, 
compare Table 2 and Box 2) and particularly the goal of alignment, 
where donors commit to base their overall support of partner countries 
on national institutions and procedures (compare Box 2).
However, the extent to which country systems shall and can be used for 
the delivery of adaptation finance under the aid effectiveness agenda 
goes beyond the possibilities of the direct access modality. The use of 
country systems under the Adaptation Fund’s direct access modality 
is limited to the use of a National Implementing Entity (NIE). An 
NIE’s responsibility includes the “overall management of the projects 
and programmes financed by the Adaptation Fund, [...] all financial, 
monitoring, and reporting responsibilities”, and the compliance with 
the fiduciary risk management standards (e.g. financial management, 
procurement, monitoring and evaluation, project development, appraisal 
and oversight).
Under the aid effectiveness agenda, only looking at the principles of the 
Paris Declaration as a reference point, the use of country systems also 
includes reporting on national budgets, partly through programme-based 
approaches (Indicator 3, Indicator 9 (see Table 2)) and the use of national 
results-oriented frameworks (Indicator 11). 
Whether, and to what extent, the climate regime is going to strengthen the 
principle of country-drivenness and the role of countries in the delivery 
of adaptation finance in the future is left to negotiations. One concrete 
possibility is the design of direct access under the Green Climate Fund. 
The governing instrument (Paragraph 47) allows the Board to “consider 
additional modalities that further enhance direct access, including 
through funding entities with a view to enhancing country ownership of 
projects and programmes” (compare, for instance, Bird / Billett / Colón 
2011; Müller 2011; Berliner et al. 2013). At its fourth meeting in June 
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2013, the GCF Board decided to consider additional modalities that 
further enhanced direct access at its first meeting in 2014.12 
2.4.2 Support for vulnerable people: finance for small-scale 
adaptation needs and for the local level
Another gap between discourse and practice exists in the implementation 
of a vulnerability-oriented funding approach, a central goal of adaptation 
finance under the climate regime. Adaptation finance is supposed to support 
those countries that are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change. From a legal perspective, this goal applies to the country level only 
but can, through provisions in the Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund, 
be extended to the community-level (see Box 1).13 The implementation of 
a vulnerability-oriented funding approach requires institutional structures 
that allow for the support of small-scale adaptation needs and for devolving 
funds to the local level as many – though not all – adaptation needs of 
vulnerable communities are small in terms of scale and financial volume and 
require the involvement of local institutions and stakeholders for successful 
implementation.
Empirical examples suggest that there is a need to make advances in practical 
implementation in order to meet this central goal of adaptation finance. The 
delivery of international adaptation finance has so far not been prioritised 
on the basis of a clearly defined vulnerability criterion (Horstmann 2011; 
Horstmann / Scholz 2011; Remling / Persson / Davis 2012). Experiences 
from the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action in Africa, 
for example, show that less than half of the countries which reported on 
12 See Decision B.04/06 in Green Climate Fund 2013: “The Board: […] (b) Noted that the 
Board will consider additional modalities that further enhance direct access, including 
through funding entities with a view to enhancing country ownership of projects and 
programmes; and that the Fund will provide for readiness and preparatory activities 
and technical assistance, such as the preparation or strengthening of low emission 
development strategies or plans, NAMAs, NAPs, NAPAs, and for in country institutional 
strengthening, including the strengthening of capacities for country coordination and 
to meet fiduciary principles and standards and environmental and social safeguards, in 
order to enable countries to directly access the Fund”.
13 Note that ‘community’ is not clearly defined in these funds and can also include local 
government; compare Footnote 1.
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the status of the implementation of the framework have budget allocations 
dedicated for disaster risk reduction at the local level (UNISDR 2011a, 5). 
Although local capacities and the role of local governance are acknowledged 
to be central in disaster risk management, a field closely intertwined with 
adaptation, the Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2011 
points to a huge and widening gap between rhetoric and reality. While 
many countries have decentralised disaster risk management and reduction, 
existing financial and technical resources do not match local governments’ 
new responsibilities. Dedicated budget allocations to local governments 
for disaster risk management “remain the exception rather than the rule” 
(UNISDR 2011b, Chapter 4.7.1).
An early analysis of national adaptation programmes of action (NAPA) 
documents indicates that the gap between rhetoric and action is probably 
similar in the field of adaptation to climate change. Only 20 of 173 adaptation 
projects identify local-level institutions as partners or agents in facilitating 
adaptation projects, even in areas where local institutions could be viewed 
as a basic component of an adaptation strategy, including agriculture, water, 
forest management or fisheries (Agrawal 2008, 42–43).
The delivery of adaptation finance to vulnerable communities involves 
various challenges (see e.g. Reid et al. 2009; Agrawal 2008) as will also 
become evident in the subsequent analysis of SIFs (see in particular sub-
section 4.2.2 on the limits in reaching the poorest and in working with the 
community). With regard to the delivery of international adaptation funds, 
one of these challenges is the reduction of transaction costs. Given the 
relatively high transaction costs of small-scale adaptation needs, their chance 
to benefit from international adaptation finance is currently low. Under the 
climate regime, most funds have so far been disbursed on a project-based 
approach, including the Adaptation Fund that explicitly wants to move to 
programmatic funding approaches where appropriate (Operational Policies 
and Guidelines, Paragraph 15(h)). This situation is not ideal, given the need 
to scale up support both financially and geographically.
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Box 4: General challenges in delivering adaptation finance
 • Creating synergies between development and climate finance 
 • Reducing fragmentation/increasing coordination
 • Implementing an integrated approach (policies, institutions, 
procedures)
 • Reducing transaction costs
 • Maximising the use of country systems
 • Delivering (international) finance for small-scale adaptation needs 
and to the local level
To date, there is little experience in the design of national institutions that 
directly devolve international adaptation funds to the local level. South 
Africa is the first country under the Adaptation Fund that in 2013 handed 
in a proposal to design a Small Grants Facility for enabling local-level 
responses to climate change. The United Nations Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF) has set up a pilot programme, the Local Climate Adaptive Living 
(LoCAL) facility that channels adaptation finance to local governments. 
Grants are disbursed as part of a local government’s regular budget envelope 
on the basis of Performance Based Climate Resilience Grants (UNCDF, 
s.a.). Countries like Bangladesh, the Philippines or Ethiopia have set up 
dedicated national funds that aim to raise and bundle bilateral, multilateral 
and national finance for the support of local-level adaptation activities 
(see Marston 2013 for a brief overview on Bangladesh and Philippines; on 
Ethiopia see, for example, FDRE / MoFED 2012). While these national 
funds do not (yet) directly access international climate finance, they can 
offer examples and learning experience for other countries with regard to 
the design of national institutions for bundling and channelling funds to sub-
national levels. Similarly, development finance has substantial experience 
with the devolution of bilateral funds.
To this effect, and in the context of the above described challenges of 
adaptation finance, this study will now analyse to what extent social 
investment funds (SIFs) could serve as an institutional structure for the 
delivery of adaptation funds. Past experience in the context of development 
finance indicates that social investment funds (SIFs) might offer a good 
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possibility for mainstreaming the delivery of adaptation finance into an 
existing institutional arrangement while meeting criteria and requirements 
of adaptation and development finance delivery as outlined above (see also 
Box 5).
For the final discussion of the potentials, limits and challenges of using SIFs 
for adaptation finance, these criteria and requirements have been merged 
into an integrated set of assessment criteria and equivalent questions. Box 2 
allows for a brief overview and comparison of the climate and development 
agenda criteria and already synthesises those criteria that are being used as 
a baseline for further analysis. Box 5 gives an overview of these integrated 
criteria and requirements together with equivalent assessment questions, 
which will be addressed in Section 5. For further explanations on the 
deduction of the assessment criteria, see also the respective methodological 
annotations in Table 1 and Boxes 2 and 5.
Box 5:  Delivering adaptation finance: minimum requirements, 
assessment criteria and questions 
Requirements and assessment 
criteria for the delivery of 
adaptation finance
Equivalent assessment question
Cost-effectiveness 
and efficiency
 • Can SIFs contribute to a cost-effective 
and efficient delivery of funds?
 • Can SIFs reduce transaction costs?
Support 
vulnerable 
countries  • In which countries do SIFs operate?
communities 
and groups
 • Do SIFs allow for the 
operationalisation of a vulnerability-
oriented funding approach?
 • Can SIFs finance activities at national, 
regional and community level?
 • Do SIFs allow for the effective 
involvement of relevant institutions 
and stakeholders?
Indicator 9  • Can SIFs finance programme-based 
approaches?
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Requirements and assessment 
criteria for the delivery of 
adaptation finance
Equivalent assessment question
Country-driven/ 
integrated 
approach
 • Do SIFs strengthen country 
ownership?
Alignment  • Do SIFs use country systems?
Indicator 4  • Do SIFs promote consistency with 
national development strategies and 
programmes? 
Indicator 5a  • Do SIFs use national public financial 
management systems for distribution?
Indicator 5b  • Do SIFs use public procurement 
systems?
Coordinated 
approach
Multitude of 
channels and 
sources
 • Can SIFs be used to channel funds 
from a multitude of channels and 
sources?
Indicator 4  • Do SIFs allow for the coordination of 
programmes? 
 • Do SIFs promote coherence in 
programming and the delivery of 
adaptation finance?
Indicator 6  • Do SIFs help to avoid parallel 
implementation structures?
Context specific  • Can SIFs consider context-specific 
information and requirements?
 • Can SIFs be adapted for financing 
policy implementation in different 
socio-economic contexts?
Gender specific  • Do SIFs allow for a gender-sensitive 
approach?
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Requirements and assessment 
criteria for the delivery of 
adaptation finance
Equivalent assessment question
Transparency  • Are SIFs transparent in governance 
and allow for a balanced and equitable 
representation of stakeholders?
 • Are SIF operations transparent?
Indicator 11  • Do SIFs have transparent and 
monitorable performance assessment 
frameworks to assess progress against 
national development strategies and 
sector programmes?
Notes: Methodological annotations
In order to simplify the representation of international minimum adaptation financing 
requirements:
 • Indicator 9 (programme-based approaches) is being shifted to the criterion of 
‘supporting vulnerable communities and groups’.
 • The criterion ‘results-based approach’ (Indicator 11) is assigned to the criterion of 
transparency as a results-based approach is one possible means to achieve transparency.
 • Indicator 3 (report on national budgets) is merged with the criterion of ‘programme-
based-approach’, as some programme-based approaches (e.g. budget support, sector 
budget support) can also be reported on budgets. 
 • The criteria ‘country-driven’ and ‘country-driven/integrated approach’ are merged.
 • The criterion ‘joint analysis’ is left out as it is not directly related to the delivery of 
finance.
3 Social investment funds: evolution, geographical 
distribution and financial magnitude
In the context of official development assistance, (ODA), social investment 
funds (SIFs) have been operating for more than 20 years in numerous 
countries around the world. Their names have changed over time and from 
country to country. They are, inter alia, called social development funds, 
community or communal investment funds or simply social funds.
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For the description of these funds, past studies have tried to establish 
typologies, distinguishing for example between ‘transitory’ and ‘permanent’ 
social funds (ILO 1994 quoted in Chacaltana 2002, 3), or differentiated 
funds according to their main policy objectives as emergency funds, 
infrastructure funds, employment funds, community development funds, 
or those that support social inclusion or decentralisation processes (see 
Cornia 1999 and Jorgensen / Van Domelen 1999; see also Serrano-Berthet 
2007).
As most of these funds have multiple objectives and as their purpose and 
design have evolved over time, there is no simple, general typology or 
commonly accepted definition. Funds have developed ‘vertically’ as well as 
‘horizontally’. To give an overview, we therefore first describe the ‘vertical’ 
evolution from a historical perspective, classifying social investment funds 
according to generations that share certain policy objectives, and then 
analyse their ‘horizontal’ development in the form of geographical extension 
and financial magnitude. After that, Section 4 looks at the operational details 
of these funds, describing and analysing common characteristics, strengths 
and weaknesses.
3.1 A working definition
For this analysis, we have chosen to use the term ‘social investment funds’ 
(SIFs) in order to emphasise their common focus on investments and to 
differentiate them from funds that deal with recurrent expenditures or 
transfers, i.e. non-investments, such as entities dedicated to the operation 
and maintenance of national parks or social welfare funds managing transfer 
payments to households on a recurrent basis.
As there is no universally accepted definition of SIFs, we will use a 
‘commonly accepted’ definition which describes them as facilities or
agencies that finance small projects in several sectors targeted to benefit 
poor and vulnerable groups based on demand generated in a participatory 
manner by local groups and screened against a set of eligibility criteria 
(Jorgensen and Van Domelen 2001). Social funds operate as intermediate 
agencies that appraise, finance, and supervise implementation of social 
investments identified and executed by a wide range of actors, including 
local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local offices 
of line ministries, and community groups (Bhatia 2005, 1).
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International finance institutions (IFIs) also refer to SIFs as loan or grant 
‘operations’ or ‘projects’. While this properly reflects the view of a lending 
institution, this analysis looks at SIFs as facilities that form an institutional 
entity at the country-level, managing social investments in the form of 
projects.
3.2 The evolution of SIFs: the development context
The evolution of SIFs was driven by two important developments, first, a 
situation of economic and social crisis (Bhattamishra-Barrett 2008, 49), 
and second, the renaissance of community-based development approaches 
(Binswanger-Mkhize / De Regt / Spector 2009).
Economic, social, and institutional crisis
The first SIFs were developed by the World Bank and Inter-American 
Development Bank as short-term emergency funds in a context of economic 
and social crisis (De Silva / Sum 2008, 2). In the mid-1980, many developing 
countries had fallen into deep economic and fiscal crisis and, advised by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, accepted ‘structural adjustment programmes’ 
(SAP), aimed at restoring industrial competitiveness and fiscal sustainability 
(e.g. World Bank 2010, 85). Among other measures, SAPs usually included 
massive lay-offs of public-sector employees, much of it by downsizing or 
outright closing unsustainable state-owned enterprises. The ensuing unrest 
of a well-organised labour force threatened to render SAPs socially and 
politically unviable. As a measure of rapid response, nationwide public 
works programmes were to be set up, to put the unemployed temporarily 
back to work (e.g. Marc et al. 1995). It was expected that this would boost 
domestic demand in the short run, until the expected structural impact of 
SAPs led to increased competitiveness, subsequent sustained growth and full 
employment. In this context, SIFs were also seen as a “major World Bank 
initiative in response to the failure of structural adjustment to safeguard the 
needs of the poor” (Abbot / Covey 1996, 2)
Part of the crisis was an institutional bottleneck for the delivery of 
investments. During the times of fiscal bonanza, central line ministries and 
other state-owned entities had grown a lot in terms of staff but little in terms 
of effectiveness, and even less as regards efficiency. This posed a serious 
impediment to the fast and cost-effective implementation of hundreds of 
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small, labour-intensive public works required across a country. A case study 
from Zambia, for example, states that “government institutions proved that 
they were unable to provide a co-ordinated, targeted and multi-sectoral 
response to emergency situations that would assist poverty reduction” 
(Crosbie 2009, 11 based on Marc et al. 1995).
To meet the challenges of the economic, social and institutional crisis, 
the Government of Bolivia as the first country decided to set up a small, 
publicly-owned entity called the “Emergency Social Fund” (FSE, Fondo 
Social de Emergencia). The fund featured a lean bureaucracy and simple 
operational rules and many private sector-like management approaches, 
including market-based recruitment and outsourcing. In 1987, the 
International Development Association (IDA) was ready to provide 
financing on conditional terms to the FSE. The FSE soon became famous for 
“its demand-based approach, its efficiency and transparency, and its rapid 
results” (Graham 1992) which spurred the set-up and massive development 
of social investment funds around the world.
The success of the first ‘emergency-types’ of SIFs in quickly generating 
employment and boosting demand led to a ‘horizontal’ spread across 
countries and continents. Partners of international development assistance 
(ODA) acted as catalysts and knowledge managers in that process. In parts, 
these roles have been assumed by regional associations of SIFs14 later on, 
which started to emerge as the funds multiplied in different continents.
At the same time, many SIFs have also evolved ‘vertically’, which explains the 
persistence of many of these entities in the same country over time. Showing 
an amazing flexibility in adapting to changing policy environments and the 
needs of their national owners and ODA partners, most SIFs continued to 
be useful institutional set-ups far beyond the emergency situation they were 
created to respond to initially (De Silva / Sum 2008, 25).
A renaissance of community-driven development approaches
An important driver for the vertical development of SIFs was the 
renaissance of community-driven development (CDD) approaches in the 
1990s (compare Figure 2). As sector bureaucracies of that time were often 
14 Such as the Social Network of Latin America and the Caribbean (REDLAC, by its 
Spanish acronym) and the Association Africaine des Agences d’Exécution des Travaux 
d’Intérêt Public (AFRICATIP).
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reluctant to encourage rural empowerment and many sector approaches were 
“too slow to deal with the adverse employment and welfare consequences 
of economic reforms and adjustment programs of the 1980s” (Binswanger-
Mkhize / De Regt / Spector 2009, 27), actors in development cooperation, 
among them the World Bank, “looked for better ways to reach communities 
directly” (ibid.).
Social funds were “multi-sectoral and gave communities the opportunity 
to specify their subproject priorities” which provided an opportunity for 
“several new experiments in community-based development [...]” using 
community consultation and participation models (Binswanger-Mkhize / 
De Regt / Spector 2009, 28; compare also World Bank 2010, 6). While SIFs 
were developed “to transfer resources to local levels and execute projects 
in a participatory manner”, CDD “programs emerged that went a step 
further and transferred resources directly to community management, while 
at the same time introducing coordination at the local government level” 
(Binswanger-Mkhize / De Regt / Spector 2009, 8–9). The World Bank used 
the term CDD “to denote this broad class of interventions that transferred 
control over resources and decision-making from central agencies to 
communities” (De Silva / Sum 2008, 2, quoting Dongier et al. 2003).
Figure 2: Evolution of SIFs’ objectives and activities
 
Figure 2: Evolution of SIFs’ objectives and activities 
 
 Source: De Silva / Sum 2008, 3
In the field of safety net programmes, social funds were seen as an innovative 
mode of delivering non-food assistance through non-governmental channels 
and became a primary means of delivering social assistance (Subbarao et 
al. 1997, 17, 137). Part of this innovative mode was that SIFs were most 
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commonly associated with the private model of delivering social assistance 
while not necessarily excluding the public sector and traditional public 
delivery models (Subbarao et al. 1997, 97). The “private delivery model 
involves a range of service deliverers, notably, private contractors, NGOs, 
and community groups sometimes in addition to public agencies” (Subbarao 
et al. 1997, 96). In this context, SIFs neither provide nor produce a service 
but facilitate service provision and production (Subbarao et al. 1997, 
97). Largely influenced by the experience of Bolivia’s FSE, the concept 
incorporates market principles into the programme design through the 
demands of beneficiaries (Subbarao et al. 1997, 137).
In order to describe the main trends in the vertical evolution of SIFs in 
more detail, we give a brief overview of SIFs based on a generation model 
(compare IDB 2002, quoted in Chacaltana 2002, 3).
3.2.1 Trends in vertical SIF evolution: generation models
Trends in the vertical evolution of SIFs can best be captured by a generation 
model. The generation model is similar to, but goes beyond, a classification 
according to main policy objectives (see above) by identifying the 
commonalities that funds had at a certain time period with regard to several 
characteristics (see Table 3). The generation model was first constructed as 
part of a study by the Inter-American Development Bank, classifying IDB 
funds on a time axis (IDB 2002). 
While the focus and design of an SIF is first and foremost a reflection of 
national policies in a given country, the commonalities of SIF generations 
also reflect macro trends in the international development debate and within 
ODA agencies.
Although real funds form the basis for our depiction of SIF generations, 
they only describe general trends and are too a certain extent ideal-type 
descriptions. These facilitate the illustration and analysis of strength and 
weaknesses of certain models. In practice, there are considerable differences 
in the vertical evolution of SIFs between countries with regard to content, 
pace and timing. The extent to which current SIFs share characteristics of a 
generation can vary as well (compare also Sub-section 3.2.3).
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First generation
The safety nets programmes ‘1st generation’ are emergency-type SIFs 
focusing on short-term economic employment opportunities (Vermehren / 
Serrano-Berthet 2005, 95) in times of economic downturn through a boost 
in public investment – ‘to hire people to dig a ditch and fill it up again’, as 
a popular explanation of these Keynes-style measures goes. These funds 
specifically address the input aspects of public investment by emphasising 
the speed of implementation and labour intensity in project selection. The 
outputs and benefits arising from projects, such as, for instance, a new 
drainage system and corresponding improvements in land-use, are welcome 
and desired, but they are not the focus of the ‘1st generation’-type of SIFs.
With speed of spending being a major concern for the effectiveness of 
SIFs, projects had to be technically simple, fast to start and implement, and 
the project management cycle needed to be as lean and swift as possible. 
Accordingly, whoever showed the capacity to implement public works fast, 
be it a public or private entity, was a suitable project executing agent for a 1st 
generation SIF. This mostly excluded local governments and communities.
Another key concern for SIFs of the first generation was the precise 
targeting of investments towards the temporarily unemployed and those 
negatively affected by SAPs, also called ‘the adjustment poor’. Resources 
were allocated based on ex-ante defined eligible investments, often in urban 
areas.
However, the distinction between ‘chronic poor’ and ‘adjustment poor’ was 
never clearly defined, or targeted. Consequently both the remit and scope 
of the Social Investment Funds began to evolve into wider programmes – 
with a shift of emphasis from ‘income maintenance to community based 
provision of social services’ (Crosbie 2009, 6 quoting Cornia 1999).
Second generation
By shifting emphasis to a community-based provision of social services, 
second generation SIFs shifted their focus from being an emergency response 
mechanism to a longer-term approach aimed at fighting structural poverty 
and massively expanding access to basic social infrastructure (Vermehren / 
Serrano-Berthet 2005, 95). Policy objectives could include the provision 
of more and better schooling and health facilities or safe drinking water in 
remote locations.
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Going along with the change of policy objectives, SIFs also changed 
their operational targets and techniques as well as rules and procedures. 
The target group of second generation SIFs shifted from the temporarily 
unemployed, frequently urban, to the structurally poor, mostly concentrated 
in rural areas. In several Latin American countries, “SIFs also developed 
programs for special target groups like orphans, disabled youngsters, youth 
at risks, and the elderly” (Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 95). The 
targeting techniques of reaching these groups developed into state-of-the-
art reference points in many countries, including multi-dimensional poverty 
mapping and participatory poverty assessment. SIF beneficiaries were 
identified through parameters such as income, access to basic services (e.g. 
health and education), or vulnerability of rain-fed agriculture to hazards.
SIFs turned their attention away from the speed and employment-intensity 
of investment to the benefits and impacts of public investment. Not only the 
investment itself, but also its quality and expected impact were of importance. 
Project selection criteria accordingly emphasised the development impact of 
projects. Towards that respect, empowerment of civil society structures at the 
local level and community participation in project selection and execution 
were regarded as key, and have become a hallmark of 2nd generation SIFs 
worldwide. The selection of project executing agencies for SIFs followed 
the logic of community-driven development. The identification, selection 
and implementation of projects were devolved to local community groups.
Rules and procedures governing the project cycle of SIFs became complex 
at the expense of speed. Calls for the incorporation of cross-cutting issues 
such as gender and environmental sustainability, aimed at further improving 
project quality, but also contributed to a loss of the simplicity that had 
characterised first generation-type SIFs.
In a bid to better handle increased complexities, some countries and their 
development partners opted to create additional SIFs emphasising a specific 
sector or issue, such as rural development, gender, or the environment. The 
ensuing proliferation of SIF-type funds within a single country has sometimes 
been considered a strategy of ‘product diversification’ by recipient countries to 
increase access to international resources on conditional (‘soft’) terms, which 
became available as new development issues rose on the international agenda.
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Third generation
Third generation SIFs emphasise the promotion of decentralisation and 
good local governance which has been a principal goal of many development 
strategies (Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 96). While the IDB study 
(2002) already identified this trend for the time period 1998/9 to 2002, an 
analysis of World Bank social funds for the fiscal years 2000 to 2007 comes 
to a similar result. Noting a general diversification of fund goals, the 
most common trend has been to increase the role of social funds in 
governments’ decentralization processes, by shifting more responsibility for 
managing local level investments and providing more direct training and 
capacity building for overseeing these investments to local governments 
(De Silva / Sum 2008, 2).
The decentralisation process forced governments and donors to rethink the 
role of SIFs in the promotion of local development. While some countries 
ignored this task or transformed their SIFs into pure fiscal transfers (e.g. 
PRONASOL/Mexico), the majority of countries reformed their SIFs. 
These reforms included merging funds, absorption by line ministries, or 
the institutionalisation as permanent institutions. Vermehren and Serrano-
Berthet (2005, 100) identify two main strategies emerging from these 
reform initiatives: one emphasises the role of SIFs for decentralisation and 
local development processes; the other stresses the institutional role of SIFs 
in reaching vulnerable and poor groups, for example as part of countries’ 
social safety nets.15
For the implementation of these strategies, countries assigned two major 
roles for SIFs. One was to transform SIFs into conditional matching grant 
mechanisms, thereby rationalising fiscal transfers to municipalities with a 
pro-poor bias and aligning and leveraging municipal investments toward 
national priorities (Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 102). Through this, 
SIFs were also used as compensatory fiscal transfers aiming to counterbalance 
existing inequalities between different government districts.16
15 This analysis of strategies is based on Bolivia, Peru, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
For a more detailed outline of these strategic directions, see Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 
2005, 101 ff.
16 See e.g. the role of the Fondo Nacional de Inversión Productiva y Social (FPS) in 
implementing Bolivia’s anti-poverty policy, National Compensation Policy (Vermehren 
/ Serrano-Berthet 2005, 102). For a detailed analysis see also Isidoro Losada 2006.
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The other role was to use SIFs to strengthen good local governance and build 
communities’ capacities in (participatory) municipal planning, financing 
and managing local infrastructure services (Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 
2005, 102).
According to the new development objectives, SIFs adapted their targeting 
techniques. Poverty maps, for example, were produced for the identification 
and prioritisation at the district or regional level. These poverty maps could 
entail criteria of institutional capacities or ‘fiscal poverty’ such as the 
endowment of local governments with funds, staff and other resources.
According to the new development objectives, SIFs also changed the role 
local governments could take in the management of funds. The analysis of 
SIFs in five Latin American countries by Vermehren and Serrano-Berthet 
(2005; Serrano-Berthet 2005) provides an interesting overview of how SIFs 
devolved ownership and responsibility to local governments in the field of 
planning, financing and implementation (see Table 2 for an impression).
Many SIFs of the third generation only invested in activities that were 
developed as part of participatory municipal planning processes. This 
represents a major change to second generation SIFs that financed 
isolated projects presented mostly by individual communities or politicians 
and approved centrally by SIFs. This [...] approach was criticized because 
of its potential to undermine local governments, and its lack of transparency 
and downward accountability (Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 104).
Third generation SIFs also transfer all or a substantial portion of resources 
directly to local governments (as the main ‘client’ of SIFs), whereby some 
municipalities transfer these resources further down to community groups 
(Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 106). In earlier SIF models until the 
late 1990s, most SIF funding was managed centrally.
Beyond the influence of policy trends that affected the evolution of SIFs, 
an important cross-cutting function of SIFs throughout time included risk 
management. As risk management also plays an important role in adaptation 
processes, we will highlight the main approaches and functions of SIFs in 
this area in the following section.
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3.2.2 SIFs and risk management
From the first generation onwards, SIFs have held an important place in 
risk management. The World Development Report 2000/1 (World Bank 
2000) categorises SIFs “as publicly provided, formal risk management 
mechanisms” (De Silva / Sum 2008, 8). Jorgensen and Van Domelen (2001) 
write that SIFs are well “positioned to enable community-based institutions 
to manage risk due to their close involvement with a range of community, 
public and market agents, and the rapidity and flexibility of their response” 
(De Silva / Sum 2008, 7; see also Batthamishra-Barrett 2008, 52).
Two main perspectives and related political contexts of risk management 
played an important role in the evolution of SIFs: disaster risk management, 
and social protection. From the beginning onwards, SIFs have regularly been 
used to provide rapid assistance in the aftermath of natural disasters (e.g. 
IEG 2006; Chacaltana 2002; Siri s.a.; Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 
95; compare also Table 4). Evaluations or case studies have shown that SIFs 
had a leading role in reinstating basic services and promoting stability, for 
example in Honduras and Nicaragua after Hurricane Mitch (see World Bank 
2010, 272; Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 95), and have proven to be 
flexible and innovative instruments for both directly responding to natural 
disasters and contributing to risk reduction (IEG 2006).17 In El Salvador, 
for example, SIFs provided resources for small construction projects like 
retrofitting or adaptation of structures for extreme weather conditions 
(Warner / Bouwer / Amman 2007).
Furthermore, SIFs were used for risk management in the field of social 
protection, for example supporting safety nets and community-driven risk 
arrangements (see above). The main reference point for SIF operations 
of the World Bank from 2001 onwards – as an example for a major SIF 
lender – was the bank’s Social Protection strategy paper (De Silva / Sum 
2008, 5; for the strategy, see World Bank 2001). The strategy entails a 
broader approach to risk management in social protection policies (see also 
Holzmann / Jorgensen 2000).
17 For an overview of characteristics that place social funds in a good position for risk 
reduction and risk response, see World Bank 2010, 7–8.
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With the general18 broader conceptualisation of risks and their role for 
poverty reduction, the role of SIFs in risk management also broadened. 
While early SIF interventions focused on risks related to natural disasters or 
the economic crisis, later SIFs aimed to address a variety of social risks that 
might render communities vulnerable to external shocks. Categories of risks 
addressed by SIFs include for instance: economic risks, natural risks, social 
risks, health risks, life-cycle risks, political risks or environmental risks. 
Examples of the risks categories addressed in the past by SIFs are provided 
in Table 4. The risk management arrangements and the related responsible 
actors that SIFs support broadly fall into three categories: informal (e.g. 
informal saving groups at the community level); market-based (e.g. 
access to micro-finance); and public arrangements (e.g. community-based 
disaster risk reduction strategies).19 Table 5 lists further examples of risk 
management-related activities in these three categories.
Over time, SIFs also expanded their support of risk management functions. 
While early SIF generations focused their support on risk coping (e.g. 
public works programmes, conditional cash-transfers, reconstruction), 
following generations increasingly addressed functions of risk mitigation 
(e.g. strengthening local institutions), or risk reduction (e.g. increase access 
to basic services, water supply and sanitation; De Silva / Sum 2008, 7; 
Chacaltana 2002, 20).20 
As the risk categories listed in Table 4 and 5 are mainly based on a conceptual 
framework from the years 2000 and 2001 (by Holzmann / Jorgensen 2000) 
and not on an empirical analysis of running SIFs, the risk categories that SIFs 
currently address can be different in practice. There is no general updated 
review or analysis on the role of SIFs in the area of risk management.
18 See also discussions by other actors in other arenas, e.g. Watts / Bohle 1993, or Kasperson 
/ Kasperson 2005.
19 See Batthamishra / Barrett 2008, 54ff on ideas of how SIFs could support community-
based risk management arrangements and on potential problems that may arise due to SIF 
support. 
20 For a trend analysis of social funds in disaster risk management in Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Madagascar and Armenia, see Siri (s.a.).
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3.2.3 Coexistence and trade-offs between generations 
The SIF generations are not mutually exclusive. Most funds support several 
objectives and activities (De Silva / Sum 2008, 2) and few SIF belong to one 
generation only. Instead, many SIFs rather preserve and use their ‘generation 
heritage’ to different degrees at different points of time. 
Depending on the political circumstances and needs, governments also 
redesign, for example, second or third generation funds into first generation 
funds. A reason for such a redesign can be an economic downturn (see e.g. 
Peru, National Fund for Social Development/Fondo Nacional de Cooperación 
para el Desarrollo Social)21, “the response to short-term rehabilitation 
needs (e.g. Nicaragua, Honduras, Madagascar and Jamaica)” (De Silva / 
Sum 2008, 2), like a natural disaster (see, for example, Haiti) or a general 
re-centralisation of social politics, as for example in Bolivia (World Bank 
2004, quoted in Isidoro Losada 2006). 
The redesign of SIFs throughout time illustrates that the attribution of a SIF 
to one generation should not be interpreted as a value judgement. Second 
or third generation SIFs are not inherently better than first generation funds. 
The quality of a specific SIF at a given moment depends on how far and 
well the fund has been able to adapt to the specific policy concern of the 
specific country at the specific point in time. Against this background, the 
SIF generation model simply helps to understand the genesis and primary 
goals as well as strengths and limitations of past SIFs as will be outlined in 
further detail in Section 4.
The evolution of SIFs shows that they can be designed in a flexible manner 
according to changing national and international policy environments and 
development currents. The development of SIFs in Bolivia illustrates this 
particularly well. Since the emergence of the FSE, Bolivian governments have 
changed and introduced different types of SIFs tailored to their respective 
policy needs (compare Isidoro Losada 2006), changing from dedicatedly 
pro-market to pronouncedly state-interventionist or mainstreaming new 
policy needs such as the Millennium Development Goals (see Treviño 
Paredes et al. 2005).
21 Before 2005, the fund was called FONCODES, Fondo Nacional de Compensación y 
Desarrollo Social.
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There are, however, also tensions and trade-offs between the three 
generations of funds. Direct interaction between a national SIF and 
grassroots communities and civil society organisations, as practiced by 
2nd generation funds, for example, tends to weaken the position of local 
governments who are the principal clients of 3rd generation SIFs. A well-
known example for deliberately weakening local governments through 
a strong national SIF was FONCODES under the Fujimori regime in the 
1990s (see Schady 1999).
Similarly, a high degree of autonomy by local governments in choosing 
from a multi-sector ‘menu’ of projects eligible for SIF financing – typical 
for 3rd generation funds – may reduce the incentives to implement national 
sector policies, as the outcomes of participatory planning processes only 
occasionally coincide with national targets for local investment.
3.3 Geographical distribution and financial magnitude 
To compile updated and precise figures on the total number and geographical 
breakdown of social investment funds today is not an easy affair, and it is 
even more difficult to arrive at definite numbers on the volume of funds and 
operations they have been handling. There are four main reasons for this: 
1. The sheer magnitude and worldwide spread of SIFs make a country-by-
country analysis a major endeavour. Such an analysis does not exist so 
far and is also beyond the scope of this study. 
2. SIFs have evolved over more than 20 years, as have their names as 
illustrated above. Therefore, identifying them is very difficult. In some 
cases, the role and functions of SIFs have been taken over by and 
integrated into other institutions, which renders it even more difficult to 
identify SIFs. 
3. The development banks that have been providing much of SIF funding 
mostly do not treat SIFs as a separate portfolio. As the funds have evolved 
into instruments of quite different policies over time, operations and 
resources executed through SIFs are earmarked according to portfolios 
as different as infrastructure, human development, governance and the 
various sectors which the instrument has been serving. An overview 
would require cross-cutting portfolio analyses.
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4. While ODA agencies tend to report SIFs as closed once the corresponding 
ODA operation has terminated, most SIFs have outlived the initial 
external support and continue to thrive on national budget resources, or 
have diversified their funding structure to other domestic and external 
sources. According to a major review by De Silva and Sum from 2008, 
this is the case for most World Bank-supported SIFs. Another major 
review even finds “many instructive cases of social funds financed 
wholly by governments” (Bhatia 2005, 6).
Nevertheless, reviews in literature and secondary data available on the 
subject provide enough references to get an idea of the order of magnitude 
of past SIFs. A stocktaking exercise in form of a workshop organised by the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW Development Bank) and the World 
Bank in 2004 concluded that SIFs had received ODA support of more than 
USD 4 billion in more than 60 countries, earning them the attribute of “one 
of the most successful financing instruments of multilateral and bilateral 
ODA in terms of financial volume” (Juntermanns / Schickinger 2004, 2). In 
2004, the KfW estimated that its financial support to SIFs amounted to EUR 
400 million for 26 countries (Juntermanns / Schickinger 2004, 2).
A review published in 2005 (Bhatia, 1) concluded that the World Bank 
financed almost USD 4 billion in social-fund-type projects in some 60 
countries and estimated that an additional USD 5 billion was leveraged 
from other multilateral, bilateral, and domestic resources. The IDB alone 
has invested USD 2.7 billion in 40 different SIFs.
The latest and most comprehensive review of SIFs financial volumes 
and regional distribution is a World Bank lending review of their social 
protection portfolio from 2008 for the fiscal year 2000 to 2007 (De Silva / 
Sum 2008). At the World Bank, social funds are – next to community-driven 
development operations – the main instrument by which the Bank engages 
with, and delivers assistance to, communities in developing countries 
(World Bank 2010, 6). The review calculates that the Bank’s commitment 
to SIFs had reached USD 5.4 billion by 2007. On a time axis, the lending 
trend analysis illustrates the rapid horizontal growth of SIFs. Between the 
first SIF in 1987 and 1999, the bank committed USD 3.5 billion, covering 
98 projects in 57 countries (De Silva / Sum 2008, 11; see also Rawlings / 
Sherburne-Benz / Van Domelen 2004). Another 42 programmes have been 
established between 2000 and 2006 (De Silva / Sum 2008; compare also 
Bhattamishra / Barrett 2008, 50).
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SIFs have been established in all ODA-eligible regions as illustrated in 
Figure 3 and Table 6. African countries had the largest number of social 
fund projects between the fiscal year 2000 and 2007, accounting for 50 
percent of the Bank’s Social Protection portfolio (De Silva / Sum 2008, 17). 
Latin America and the Caribbean, initially regions with most SIF lending, 
have received less lending through these funds in recent years. According 
to UN Habitat (2009, 18) the average fund size in Latin America is USD 
240 million compared to USD 18 million in Asia. In countries where the 
International Development Association (IDA)22 operates, the SIF portfolio 
represents 61 percent of lending for social protection operations between 
the fiscal year 2000 and 2007 (De Silva / Sum 2008, 14).
Figure 3:  Regional distribution of SIF projects in the social protection 
portfolio of the World Bank, FY 2000 to 2007 
 Source: De Silva / Sum 2008, 16
22 IDA is part of the World Bank and operates in the poorest countries, see http://www.
worldbank.org/ida/what-is-ida.html for further information.
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Table 6:  Countries with SIFs from the World Bank’s social protection 
portfolio between 1987 and 2007 
AFRICA EUROPE 
AND 
CENTRAL 
ASIA
LATIN 
AMERICA 
AND THE 
CARIBBEAN
MIDDLE 
EAST AND 
NORTHERN 
AFRICA
EAST ASIA 
PACIFIC and 
SOUTH ASIAN 
REGION
Angola 
Benin
Burundi
Comoros
Congo, dem. 
Rep.
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Lesotho 
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Nigeria
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Senegal
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda 
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Albania
Armenia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Bulgaria
Georgia 
Kosovo 
Macedonia
Moldova 
Romania
Tajikistan
Turkey 
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Argentina 
Belize 
Bolivia
Colombia 
Ecuador 
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras
Jamaica 
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Saint Lucia
Algeria
Egypt
Lebanon
Morocco
West Bank 
and Gaza 
Yemen
Cambodia 
Lao PDR 
Philippines 
Sri Lanka
Thailand 
Timor-Leste
Source: Author’s representation based on data by De Silva / Sum 2008 
The extent to which the World Bank data is representative for SIF lending 
over time is unclear. There is no comprehensive overview on the status of 
SIFs; particularly data on the last seven years is lacking. What is important 
to note for the scope of this study are two points: 
 • There is experience with SIFs as a financing agency in at least 60 
countries across the globe. As many governments opted to reform SIFs 
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(compare ‘third generation’ above), they are probably still part of the 
institutional landscape in a vast number of developing countries.
 • The fact that SIFs have been established in many countries and the high 
financial volume that has been trusted to and channelled through SIFs 
underpin the importance of SIFs as a financing agency for local-level 
development activities. 
From the perspective of international adaptation finance, SIFs therefore merit 
further discussion to the extent they can be used to channel international 
finance to the ground. 
3.4 Preliminary conclusions
The brief analysis of the evolution of SIFs over time has shown that SIFs have 
been intensively used by international development banks, ODA agents and 
recipient governments for the delivery of international finance for investments 
at the local level. SIFs have been financed by different sources coming from 
development aid, multilateral banks or national budgets and have been used 
to channel resources to the regional, local and community level. 
The primary goals of SIF interventions have changed over time. Despite these 
changes, SIFs have persisted and have been reformed. This demonstrates on 
the one hand that it is possible to adapt SIF operations to new policy goals 
and targets, and more importantly, that SIFs have been valued as a facility or 
agency for the delivery of investments at the local level and have therefore 
been maintained. One reason for the appreciation of SIFs is the possibility 
to involve local actors to varying degrees in the management and use of 
funds. Another is the development of techniques that allowed a targeted 
approach for fund allocations.
SIFs and adaptation finance share strategic perspectives
From an institutional perspective and in the context of countries’ poverty 
reduction strategies, SIFs and adaptation finance share strategic perspectives. 
Vermehren and Serrano-Berthet in 2005 concluded that governments have 
assigned three main strategic roles to SIFs, which at the same time means 
that governments and the various responsible actors involved in reform 
processes have identified three roles for whose fulfilment they attribute a 
particular strength to SIFs. These three roles are: 
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1.  “Engines of local development: As decentralization processes deepen 
in Latin America, governments – at the central and local level – assign 
social funds a major role in financing local investments and building 
capacity at the municipal and community levels to ensure a transparent, 
inclusive and participatory development process
2.  Laboratories for innovation: Many social funds have not only introduced 
innovative practices and procedures, but have also created innovative 
programmes and approaches to development, with particular focus on 
the poorest and most vulnerable
3.  Promoters of social capital: Social funds are one of the few central 
government organizations that work in a multi-sectorial way at the local 
level, building community organizations and capacity of communities 
to design and manage their own development process” (Vermehren / 
Serrano-Berthet 2005, 115, accentuation by author).
With regard to the international financing requirements and challenges, 
these strategic roles are particularly interesting as they overlap with 
important requirements of international adaptation finance (see Section 2) 
and/or adaptation processes as such:
 • Adaptation finance should not only support vulnerable countries but also 
groups and communities (see Box 1), but so far the delivery mode to 
local levels is often unclear and/or contested. As this is a major role of 
SIFs, they can offer an example and should be looked at more closely. 
 • Innovation in the delivery of finance is also an overarching goal or 
need in adaptation finance. The Adaptation Fund allows for innovative 
approaches as the proposal of South Africa shows. Although many 
actors generally reject ODA channels from a negotiation perspective, 
they should not with regard to the technical and practical experience 
of delivery channels, particularly when strategic and/or practical goals 
overlap. In addition, as outlined above, many SIFs have been transformed 
into nationally owned institutions. 
 • Finally, the local level and local level institutions (should) play an 
important role in adaptation processes or related tasks like disaster risk 
reduction and management. Adaptation finance, furthermore, aims at an 
integrated, cross- or multi-sectorial, approach. 
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Beyond this strategic perspective on the roles of SIFs in development finance 
and possible roles in adaptation finance: To what extent is the experience of 
SIFs relevant for current challenges of adaptation finance delivery? Based 
on the previous analysis, four points are particularly important: 
1.  Institutional experience: SIFs provide context-specific experience in 
the institutional design of delivering investments to the local level. They 
are probably still part of the institutional landscape in a vast number of 
developing countries. They can, therefore either i) be used directly to 
deliver adaptation funds if they already finance activities relevant for 
adaptation strategies; ii) be adapted to also deliver adaptation funds; 
or iii) provide useful lessons for designing institutional structures for 
delivering adaptation finance. (On the extent of thematic overlap of 
the SIF portfolio and climate change adaptation finance, see the third 
point.)
2.  Experience in delegating ownership and responsibility: Beyond 
delivering resources to the local level, SIFs can provide an example 
and lessons learnt of how ownership and certain responsibilities in the 
management of adaptation funds (such as project identification and 
selection, planning, implementation and maintenance; compare Table 2 
and Section 4) can be devolved to local governments and communities. 
As described in Section 2 and Box 3, this is a current challenge of 
international adaptation finance. 
3.  Thematic overlap: This brief analysis shows that SIFs financed or still 
finance activities in a wide range of issue areas aiming to address one or 
several objectives and capacities that can also be relevant for adaptation 
processes. As outlined above, two of these relevant issue areas are 
disaster risk management and social protection. 
  Several Global Assessment Reports on Disaster Risk Reduction 
highlight the role of effective social protection for disaster risk 
management of household resilience and underline the increasing 
recognition of social protection for increasing pre-disaster resilience 
(UNISDR 2011b, particularly Section 4.6.4; UNISDR 2009). Malawi’s 
new Social Support policy, for example, explicitly links social protection 
to disaster risk reduction (UNISDR 2011b, Box 4.7). The possible 
linkages between these two areas and climate change adaptation have 
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been widely acknowledged and analysed (see, for example, Jones et 
al. 2010; Davies / Oswald / Mitchell 2009; Heltberg 2007; Bockel / 
Thoreux / Sayagh 2009; World Bank et al. 2011; World Bank 2012; 
Davies et al. 2009; Cipryk 2009; Stirbu 2010; IPCC 2012). In practice, 
however, these three areas are often “silos” (World Bank et al. 2011, 
15ff) rather than being integrated in the form of policies, institutions or 
instruments.
  SIFs could offer an opportunity for an integrated, cross-sectoral means 
of implementation, but of course there are practical challenges as the 
examples listed in Table 7 illustrate and, so far, insufficient attention has 
been paid to longer term reconstruction needs in disaster risk reduction 
(UNISDR 2011a, 4), and long-term risks posed by climate change 
(Davies et al. 2009, 3, 7–10). 
Table 7:  Challenges of implementing social protection measures for climate 
adaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
Social protection 
measure
Benefits for adaptation and 
disastser risk reduction
Challenges
Weather-based 
crop insurance
 • Rapid payouts possible
 • Guards against the adverse 
selection and moral hazard
 • Frees up assets for 
investment in adaptive 
capacity
 • Easily linked to trends and 
projections for climate 
change
 • Supports adaptive 
flexibility and risk taking
 • Targeting marginal 
farmers
 • Tackling differentiated 
gender impacts
 • Affordable premiums 
for poor
 • Subsidising capital costs
 • Integrating climate 
change projections 
into financial risk 
assessment
 • Guarantee mechanisms 
for re-insurance
Britta Horstmann / Günther Schulz-Heiss
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)62
Table 7 (cont.):  Challenges of implementing social protection measures for 
climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
Social protection 
measure
Benefits for adaptation and 
disastser risk reduction
Challenges
Seed transfer  • Boost agricultural 
production and household 
food security
 • Post disaster response tool
 • Seed varieties can be 
tailored to changing local 
environmental conditions
 • Cost effectiveness of seed 
voucher and fair projects
 • Fairs promote crop 
diversity and information 
sharing
 • Ensuring locally 
appropriate seed and 
fertiliser varieties
 • Protection of crop 
diversity
 • Reduce distortion of 
local markets
 • Focus on access rather 
than only availability
 • Inclusive approach 
that draws in marginal 
farmers
Asset transfer  • Ability to target most 
vulnerable people
 • Easily integrated in 
livelihoods programmes
 • Ensuring local 
appropriateness of 
assets
 • Integrating changing 
nature environmental 
stresses in asset 
selection
Cash transfers  • Targeting of most 
vulnerable to climate 
shocks
 • Smoothing consumption 
allowing adaptive risk-
taking and investment
 • Flexibility enhanced to 
cope with climate shocks
 • Ensuring adequate size 
and predictability of 
transfers
 • Long term focus 
to reduce risk over 
extended timeframes
 • Demonstrating 
economic case for cash 
transfers related to 
climate shocks
 • Use of socio-ecological 
vulnerability indices for 
targeting
Source: Davies et al. 2009, 25
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Beyond disaster risk management and social protection, other issue areas 
can be relevant for adaptation processes as well, like supporting informal 
and/or local institutions. The extent to which SIF-supported activities and 
capacities link to adaptation processes needs to be analysed further in a 
respective country context. The important prerequisite for an integrated 
approach in the form of policies, institutions, and instruments is an 
integrated perspective and analysis of these topics.
4.  Risk management as an analytical entry point: The perspective of 
risk and risk management has played an important role in past SIF 
interventions and offers a good conceptual entry point for an integrated 
approach, as it is a central element in all three areas: climate change 
adaptation, social protection, and disaster risk management. 
  An updated review or analysis of the role of risk management in current 
SIF operations is lacking. As it is important to tailor SIFs to country 
contexts, such an analysis can also be directly conducted at the country 
level. At least three questions should be answered in such an analysis: 
i) Are there SIFs in the country? ii) To what extent do they have a role 
in risk management? iii) To what extent are the risks addressed by SIFs 
relevant for adaptation to climate change? 
So far, SIFs seem to provide much potential for adaptation finance, at the 
strategic level in an institutional arrangement, as a facility for channelling 
adaptation funds, or as a learning experience for institutional design. To 
what extent SIFs have demonstrated the necessary operational quality in 
practice in the past will be looked at in the following section. 
4 Social investment funds: operational characteristics, 
strengths and weaknesses 
In an evaluation by the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department 
(World Bank 2005)23, the operational track record of SIFs looks promising. 
The World Bank’s social fund portfolio in Africa has a 96 percent 
‘satisfactory’ rating and is therewith one of the best performing portfolios in 
Africa (De Silva / Sum 2008, 17). However, the reforms undertaken between 
SIF generations also indicate that there were weaknesses and reform needs. 
23 Renamed Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) in 2005.
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For an assessment of the strength and weaknesses of the SIF model and 
its potential role in adaptation finance, it is important to understand and 
look at the ‘design logic’ and operational characteristics in more detail. With 
regard to the question of how best to design the institutional structure at the 
national level, we particularly look at criticism related to the institutional 
arrangement and experience with the delivery of resources to poor 
communities or to the local level. 
4.1 Common operational structure and core features 
As highlighted by the definition in Section 3, SIFs channel funds to small-
scale projects, based on demand generated in a participatory manner by 
local groups or governments. The SIF model is seen as a pioneer in working 
with and subcontracting work to local actors through innovations in project 
management and organisational procedures which has “led to the effective 
and speedy implementation of numerous small, localized subprojects” 
(Bhatia 2005, viii, 1, 3; World Bank 2002). An overarching goal of SIF 
investment is that these should benefit the poor (World Bank 2002, 12; see 
Sub-section 4.1.5). 
Small-scale investments in social infrastructure, including a demand-driven 
approach and stakeholder participation in these investments, are seen as key 
features of SIF models, along with a certain degree of institutional autonomy 
that allowed innovations in project management and organisational 
procedures. From a public-sector perspective, a key feature of SIFs is “the 
existence of a separate, flexible, grant-making facility for local projects” 
(Serrano-Berthet 2007, 1; compare also Abbot / Covey 1996, 3–4). The 
next section gives a brief overview of the general institutional structure 
and procedures of channelling funds. Some of the related core features are 
further detailed in the Sub-sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.5.
4.1.1 Legal status, institutional structure and procedures
SIFs are usually government-owned entities with a high degree of 
managerial and operational autonomy, supervised by a board or steering 
committee of key stakeholders while delegating responsibility in project 
implementation to subcontractors. 
Providing international adaptation finance for vulnerable communities
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 65
The fact that international development banks and other ODA partners have 
provided the bulk of finance for the start-up and continuity of most SIFs has 
contributed to the view that these funds are basically ODA projects. However, 
most SIFs are part of the overall public sector (Bhatia 2005, vii) owned by 
governments and are used as vehicles to implement national policies beyond 
the end of initial ODA support. A major review of World Bank operations 
comes to the conclusion that governments have managed to sustain SIFs as 
the vast majority still operate after bank operations have been terminated 
(De Silva / Sum 2008, 19). There are SIFs that are financially completely 
owned by national governments (Bhatia 2005, 6).24
Institutional autonomy
SIFs are usually managed by an autonomous or semi-autonomous agency, 
located within the government, but set up parallel to government structures 
(Abbot / Covey 1996, 4; UN Habitat 2009, 3; Crosbie 2009, 11; Bhatia 
2005, 104–105). SIFs can be under ministerial units or programmes (UN 
Habitat 2009, 3; Bhatia 2005, 104), government banks or foundations, but 
they can also be set up as a non-profit company (Bhatia 2005, 18, 104), or 
they can be legally owned by non-profit foundations (De Silva / Sum 2008, 
5) or NGOs (Bhatia 2005, 105). In a review of 15 World Bank SIFs, most 
SIFs were an independent agency under the president and prime minister 
and even more were accountable to them (Bhatia 2005, 105).
The autonomy of SIFs can comprise legal, managerial and operational, 
policy or financial autonomy and varies “according to the political and 
administrative profile of a country” (Bhatia 2005, 17). Autonomy is 
achieved by setting up the fund as a separate legal entity, often established 
by an executive decree or public law (De Silva / Sum 2008, 2; Bhatia 2005, 
17–18), or by “partial exemption from existing public sector laws and 
regulations, such as civil service salaries and procurement and disbursement 
regulations” (Bhatia 2005, vii).
The degree of autonomy varies greatly from fund to fund (World Bank 2002, 
2). In an evaluation of SIFs in the European and Central Asia Region, Serrano-
Berthet (2007, 5) concludes that “there is more autonomy in operational 
24 However“[n]ational governments rarely support more than 20 percent of the Funds [sic.] 
finances, therefore leaving the fund’s semi-permanent status to rely on the financial whims 
of donors” (UN Habitat 2009, 19).
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and managerial procedures than in budgetary and accountability issues”. 
While many SIFs usually have a good degree of managerial and operational 
autonomy, they have less policy autonomy. Their policies are predetermined 
and overseen by either the government (mostly a ministry), or by a board of 
directors or steering committee (Bhatia 2005, vii, 18; Serrano-Berthet 2007, 
viii). Often, government officials hold a significant share of seats in the 
board or committee; however, these can also include NGOs, private sector 
representatives and, in some cases, donor agencies (Bhatia 2005, vii, 105). 
The board can also include sub-national government levels especially in the 
3rd generation-type of SIFs.
Board participation of line ministries is one possibility used to support 
alignment with national policies and standards, such as master plans for 
irrigation or construction standards for classrooms, as well as overall 
development strategies.
Fund management and stakeholder engagement in the project cycle
While SIF policies and strategies are predetermined and supervised by a 
ministry, board, or steering committee, a chief executive officer (CEO) has 
responsibility for day-to-day operations. This officer is elected or appointed 
by the supervising entity or even higher levels of government (president or 
Figure 4: Examples of institutional agency of 29 SIFs 
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even parliament) as some SIF CEOs have come to manage portfolios bigger 
than single line ministries. The degree of powers conferred on SIF CEOs is 
a measure for SIF autonomy itself. It may include the approval of individual 
projects, usually up to a certain amount, without prior vetting by the board.
In some SIFs, funds are collected, disbursed, managed, and monitored by 
a central fund’s in-house project management unit (PMU) (UN Habitat 
2009, 19). The PMU acts as a kind of ‘mini-bank’, or ‘holding agency of 
funds’ and distributes these to sub-contractors such as NGOs or micro-
credit-groups (Crosbie 2009, 8) or local governments. Many SIFs also 
have regional offices or officers. In well consolidated SIFs, however, donor 
funds are not handled by a specifically ‘shielded’ PMU, but rather by the 
already established structure of the respective fund, according to commonly 
agreed-upon procedures and guidelines (see e.g. FISE 2001 and FPS 2011). 
This increased use of country systems has, for example, become a standard 
practice in programmes carried out by SIFs in Nicaragua, Peru and Bolivia 
by the German Development Bank KfW.
Operational manuals
One defining feature of SIFs’ management “is their use of operational 
manuals for day-to-day functioning” (Bhatia 2005, vii). Operational 
manuals are “legitimized by the credit agreement between the host country 
and the donor” (Bhatia 2005, 19) and describe how projects are to be 
carried out from identification to delivery. Operational manuals describe 
the guiding principles and modes of operation, including requirements on 
participatory approaches in project identification and selection, technical 
and economic minimum standards for different kind of projects to assure 
quality, and transparent outsourcing and contracting (as an example see e.g. 
FPS 2011 or FISE 2001).25
25 See also Weissman 2001 for an in-depth discussion of the importance and characteristics 
of operation manuals in SIFs.
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Demand-driven project selection
Investment decisions by SIFs are driven by supply and demand (World Bank 
2002, 17). A common feature of SIFs is their bottom-up, demand-driven 
approach in the selection and design of projects (UN Habitat 2009, 5; Abbot 
/ Covey 1996, 4; Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 110; De Silva / Sum 
Figure 5: Example of an institutional SIF structure
CSOs Elected local
governments
Local offices  of
line agencies
DONOR
Social
fund
Private firms, 
contractors/suppliers
Regional/local
offices of SF
PMU of SF
SF Board/
Steering
Commiee
Implemenng
agencies
Community
Central 
government/
Line Ministry
Notes:
SF: Social fund
PMU: Project management unit
Source: Adapted from Bhatia 2005, 95
Figure 5 gives an overview of a very simplified institutional structure of SIFs 
and the stakeholders involved. “For simplicity neither all the institutions nor all 
the links are depicted. For example, regional governments are not shown, and 
in many cases the community receives the money directly from the social fund 
and therefore the community becomes both the implementing agency and the 
beneficiary. The elected local governments and the local offices of line agencies 
would be under the administrative control of the local governments and thus not 
shown separately. The political and administrative arm of a truly decentralized 
body would be the same" (Bhatia 2005, 94).
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2008, 2). Instead of fund managers pre-designing projects, community or 
local government representatives can hand in project proposals (Abbot / 
Covey 1996, 3; Crosbie 2009, 11). In third generation funds, SIFs induce 
local governments to apply demand-driven approaches in their own planning 
process with local communities.
Supply-driven project selection
However, the range of choice is usually limited by supply factors. SIFs have 
more technical expertise in some sectors than others, often have a limited 
menu of project options, and use eligibility and appraisal criteria, and 
targeting mechanisms (World Bank 2002, 17; on targeting mechanisms see 
Sub-section 4.1.5).
The menu of project options defines a range of permissible projects 
(compare also Abbot / Covey 1996, 3; Crosbie 2009, 11), often limit the 
variety of projects that can be financed and provide standard blueprints for 
the type of projects mostly demanded. Communities or local governments 
choose from the menu according to their local priorities or local development 
(public investment) programmes. Usually, they are also given a certain 
degree of choice with regard to context-specific design features of the 
project. However, the design of the project menu depends on project design 
and goals. The menu can be an ‘open menu of eligible investments’ or restrict 
the scope of activities to infrastructure (compare project design options in 
Carvalho et al. 2004, 20). The social fund in Nicaragua, for example, 
found that without giving communities a menu of social infrastructure, 
communities were able to articulate more freely their preferences and 
mention other things that were not part of the central government’s policy 
for poverty alleviation (Carvalho / Gillian / White 2004, 19; compare also 
Sub-section 4.1.4 on further aspects). 
The menu of permissible projects is commonly part of the central agency’s 
allocation scheme which is embedded in a national poverty reduction 
strategy and top-down targeting strategy (compare UN Habitat 2009, 19). 
The central agency allocates funds based on the fund’s objectives and pre-
specified eligibility criteria, which can include the level of community 
participation and prevalence of poverty within the community (Bhattamishra 
/ Barrett 2008, 50). At times, SIFs used full-fledged cost-benefit analysis to 
assess the quality of projects proposed for funding. Proposals put forward 
by local governments to the national SIF FONCODES in Peru, for example, 
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have to follow the elaborate procedures of ex-ante evaluation prescribed 
by the national system of public investment, overseen by the Ministry of 
Finance.
Project implementation
After project selection, the project is either implemented by the community 
itself or by selected contractors (UN Habitat 2009, 5). As SIF project cycles 
have a defined beginning and end, the engagement of the sub-contractor “is 
only required to serve the purpose of delivering the project and no further” 
(UN Habitat 2009, 24).
4.1.2 Outsourcing of work and co-financing
SIFs delegate the execution of considerable parts of the project cycle to 
the private sector, communities and/or local governments.
Depending on the SIF, local actors can take over responsibilities in the 
management of funds and projects, as outlined in Table 2 on the role of 
local governments in planning, financing, and implementing projects. 
One example area where SIFs delegate responsibility to communities or 
community groups is procurement (or contracting). SIFs usually have a 
private-sector approach in commissioning procurement opportunities to 
sub-contractors (UN Habitat 2009, 3) like communities. Among the SIFs 
analysed by Bhatia (2005, 27) “[m]ost social funds allow community-
based contracting for projects below a certain predetermined limit”. SIFs 
pioneered such community-based contracting procedures, which allow 
an effective and speedy implementation of numerous, small, localised 
subprojects. “[D]irect financing of communities basically promotes 
the delegation of contracting functions for small investments directly to 
community groups. This not only promotes transparency, it also results in 
significant cost savings over traditional, centralized procurement systems” 
(Bhatia 2005, 27).
“Providing funding to local-level institutions, such as community-based 
groups, NGOs and local governments in a more flexible, transparent and 
rapid manner” was one central and common goal of SIFs (Abbot / Covey 
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1996, 4).26 In the mid-1990s, the World Bank estimated that between 15 and 
20 % of social funds flowed through NGOs (Malena 1996, 17, quoted in 
Abbot / Covey 1996, 4).
The benefits of this division of labour and specialisation in terms of 
cost-effectiveness and speed of small-scale public investment made SIFs 
delegate a number of specialised tasks to specialised third parties, while 
keeping the overall control of the full project cycle. Outsourcing the 
financially most important part of the project cycle, like construction works 
in project execution, became part of the success story and the rule with 
SIFs, as ministries of education and other non-specialised public entities 
turned out not to be especially good in constructing buildings, for example. 
Furthermore, conflicts of interest between different parts of the project cycle 
– such as construction and supervision – were predetermined if fulfilled by 
the same actor. Much of public investment done this way was slow and 
expensive. Some SIFs went further and outsourced other parts of the project 
cycle such as project supervision to independent engineers. Scope, rules and 
procedures of outsourcing – usually by some form of competitive bidding – 
became part of the management approach described in operation manuals.
A recent ex-post evaluation of the social fund FISE (Fondo de Inversión 
Social de Emergencia) in Nicaragua by the German Development Bank KfW 
concluded that “the introduction of so-called municipality-based projects 
(“Proeyectos Guiados por la Comunidad”/PGC) [...] was especially 
important” (KfW 2013, 5) for strengthening human capital and for the 
overall impact of small-scale projects at the local level. The involvement of 
the population has meanwhile become standard practice and is compulsory 
by law (KfW 2013, 5).
As SIFs evolved into 2nd and 3rd generation funds, the number of stakeholders 
involved in the different parts of the project cycle became bigger, and the 
division of labour more complex. Line ministries, for example, got more 
closely involved in revising project proposals for their sector sustainability, 
such as the availability of teachers to run a school to be built with SIF funding, 
or the environmental impact of a road to be constructed. The increasing 
incorporation of ‘soft’ components in SIF standard projects, such as community 
26 See Carvalho / Gillian / White (2004, Box 4) for an example from Zambia that describes 
the transition from a second generation fund directly involving communities only to a 
third generation fund also involving local government actors. 
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organisation and training in rural water supply, further added to the complexity 
of the project cycle and often demanded the incorporation of new partners 
and outsourcing modalities, such as contracting NGOs for ‘soft’ components 
of projects. Among the alternative and additional modalities of outsourcing 
tested, community execution to replace or complement outsourcing to private-
sector companies received special attention in various countries.
Co-financing
As already indicated above, SIFs usually require a certain percentage of 
co-financing of the total project costs by communities and local governments. 
Contributions from communities are frequently made in kind comprising 
unskilled labour and locally available construction materials. Local 
governments participate with cash contributions from their fiscal revenues 
such as local taxes and block transfers from national government. In both 
cases, the contribution is not to exceed what beneficiaries can afford, but 
should go beyond a symbolic token to enhance ownership by beneficiaries.
Depending on the circumstances, the proportion of participation of the 
beneficiary or counterpart in total project costs is frequently in the range of 5 
to 15 % for communities and 25 % or more in the case of local governments 
(Schulz-Heiss 2011). The rate of co-financing can vary and can be part of 
a targeting strategy in resource allocation (compare Sub-section 4.1.5). 
Details of terms and conditions for accessing funds are usually spelled out in 
SIF operational manuals, in order to ensure equal and transparent treatment 
for all SIF clients.27 A World Bank evaluation from 2002 showed that one 
in four social fund projects (14 of 52) required no community contribution 
and in those projects where it was required was not always made (World 
Bank 2002, 18). 
27 Mainly in the past, SIF funds have also been distributed in the form of loans instead of 
grants. Many 2nd generation SIFs have, at some point, dealt with poor, private-sector 
groups of civil society, such as farmer associations, on a loan rather than grant basis when 
financing ‘productive’ investments supposed to have an economic as well as financial 
return, such as the purchase of improved seed or irrigation facilities. Others SIFs have 
dedicated whole programmes to the set-up of microfinance schemes to benefit such groups 
and individuals (Gross / De Silva 2002). The microfinance sector has undergone a dramatic 
development since, and private-sector institutions and banks, rather than SIFs, now finance 
these programmes. 3rd generation SIFs in some countries, on the other hand, have served as 
banks to subnational governments. This specialised role, however, is nowadays assigned to 
specialised financial institutions, mostly state-owned banks, rather than SIFs.
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From an economic and theoretical perspective, co-financing and the selection 
of projects on the basis of demand through community participation ensures 
high net benefits of SIF investments (World Bank 2002, 17).28 In Yemen, 
for example, this has led to substantial cost savings in school construction 
(Bhatia 2005, 68, Box 4.4). In general, practical examples have shown 
that, through the collaboration between government agencies, community 
stakeholders and the private sector, SIFs have been able to mobilise 
community resources and stimulate private contracting capacity (World 
Bank 2002, xvii).
4.1.3 Scope and type of product
SIFs usually finance large volumes of small-scale projects in a variety of 
different sectors.
Cross-sectoral scope
The SIF model is not tied to a special sector or issue of government policies 
but has shown itself to be a suitable vehicle for a wide range of public 
policies. Since the beginning, SIFs have operated in a variety of sectors 
beyond the realm of a single line ministry (De Silva / Sum 2008, 2). While 
the success of the SIF model has spurred a ‘product diversification’ into 
single-sector or single-issue funds in some countries, mainstream SIFs 
maintain their character of multi-sector funds. While SIFs were initially 
often founded for a specific purpose, most social funds gradually address 
several objectives (e.g. delivery of basic services, capacity-building of local 
institutions, etc.; see De Silva / Sum 2008, 25; Weissmann 2001; World 
Bank 2002, 2).
28 See also Batthamishra / Barrett 2008, 61: “Relative to market-based arrangements, 
community-based arrangements have important informational advantages. Since rural 
communities typically have intimate knowledge regarding the circumstances and needs of 
member households, they are better able to identify the most needy and vulnerable among 
them, thereby improving targeting outcomes. In addition, due to their close physical 
proximity and frequent, repeated interactions between them, they can use relatively 
low-cost methods of contract enforcement, such as peer monitoring and the threat of 
social sanctions. These advantages enable the viable delivery of financial services, such 
as microinsurance, microcredit and microsavings, at prices that are accessible to poor 
households, which is often not the case for a typical commercial provider.”
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Typical activities financed by SIFs were construction or rehabilitation of 
schools, piped water supply systems and health facilities and roads (World 
Bank 2002, 1; Carvalho / Gillian / White 2004, 18). As the sample of SIFs 
in Table 8 shows, several activities financed by SIFs like irrigation works, 
erosion or flood control could potentially be of importance for adaptation to 
climate change. The sample also illustrates that the SIF model was used for 
financing local activities that reduced green-house gases, e.g. by financing 
electrification through renewable energies or energy saving technologies.
Table 8: SIF investment by type of activity
Activity Projects 
(%)
Activity Projects 
(%)
School construction/
rehabilitation
94 Culverts 38
Construction and/or 
rehabilitation of piped water 
supply systems
91 Footpaths 38
Construction/rehabilitation of 
health facilities
85 Provision of teaching 
supplies and/or 
educational furniture
53
Road construction/
rehabilitation
83 Markets 34
Bridge construction/
rehabilitation
60 Erosion control 32
Drainage works 57 Forestry 30
Construction and/or 
rehabilitation of wells, 
handpumps
55 Flood control 28
Irrigation works 53 Microcredit 25
Training, capacity building, 
technical assistance
53 Housing/ dwellings for 
children, elderly
23
Solid waste disposal, 
sanitation works
45 Agroprocessing 21
Table 8: SIF investment by type of activity
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Table 8 (cont.): SIF investment by type of activity
Activity Projects 
(%)
Activity Projects 
(%)
Latrine construction/
rehabilitation
43 Infrastructure for street 
children, homeless
19
Provision of medicines/
equipment
42 Electrification 15
Sports complexes, 
community centers, day care 
centers
40
Notes:  N =53; several activities per fund possible.
Source: World Bank 2002, 67
Type of product
Products developed by SIFs have been diversified over time, in response to 
the new and changing needs of public policies. SIFs have run free-standing 
training programmes for capacity building, have set up microfinance 
schemes for small private enterprises and have piloted innovative forms of 
welfare systems, including ‘conditional cash transfers’ which have turned 
into recurrent government programmes in many countries (De la Brière / 
Rawlings 2006). 
The main output and core business of SIFs, however, are projects. The only 
type of SIF output which has come to rival ‘projects’ to some degree at the 
beginning of this century has been microfinance schemes, which accounted 
for a third of physical outputs in a review of World Bank operations with 
SIFs between FY 2002 and 2006 (De Silva / Sum 2008, 23). Development 
thinking and practice, however, has turned to other, more specialised 
institutional arrangements to deliver microfinance. 
Volume of projects
Although governments have at times turned to SIFs for the management of 
large-size public investments (e.g. beyond the million-dollar barrier), SIFs 
have mainly financed small-scale projects (Crosbie 2009, 11), typically in 
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the range of USD 10,000 to 100,000. Micro-projects of a few or less than 
USD 1,000 are usually unattractive for SIFs. Here, grass-roots based NGOs 
and local governments are better positioned for project implementation 
(Schulz-Heiss 2011).
The number of projects SIFs can finance annually is high. Between the 
Fiscal Years 2002 and 2006, for example, the World Bank supported 20 SIFs 
delivering over 90,000 projects (De Silva / Sum 2008, 23), which on average 
equals 900 projects annually per SIF (for the quantity, access, and utilisation 
of physical infrastructure supported by SIFs, see also World Bank 2002, 11, 
Box 2.1.) .
4.1.4 Specialisation, standardisation, bundling of projects
Specialised institutional skills, standardisation and bundling of projects 
into programmes have helped SIFs reduce transaction costs and 
mainstream national policies and quality standards. 
SIFs around the world have specialised in particular skills and targets 
required in delivering public investments. As projects in each sector require 
at least some amount of sector-specific expertise, the menu of projects 
available through SIFs has usually been limited to those most demanded, 
allowing them to maintain the comparative advantages of specialisation and 
a lean institution. 
Through the standardisation and bundling of small projects into packages, 
SIFs can achieve a high volume of operations and relatively reduce transaction 
costs. Standardisation of operations is achieved by operation manuals, as 
well as the design and cost blueprints that describe the way projects are to 
be carried out from identification to delivery. For example, once a similar 
kind of school room has to be constructed in dozens or hundreds of places, 
project preparation and supervision activities can be bundled into packets 
that reduce staff time and travel costs. The same construction design can be 
used many times with little adaptation, spreading its fixed costs between 
large numbers of projects. A standardisation of proven procedures for 
project identification and follow-up can dramatically cut down the cost of 
trial and error involved in one-of-a-kind projects, and even reduce the time 
and cost of staff training needed per project.
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Box 6:  Alignment with national policies through standardisation: 
hexagonal classrooms in Bolivia
An example of how SIFs standards have been used as a ‘transmission 
belt’ between national and local investment decisions is the national 
educational reform programme of Bolivia in the late 1990s. The national 
Ministry of Education had come to consider hexagonal classrooms the 
most appropriate environment for teachers and students to implement the 
pedagogical reform curricula. But local mayors did not like the design 
for the increased complexity and cost of construction and maintenance, 
and kept on building pre-reform, rectangular-shaped classrooms. At that 
time, local governments were in charge of the provision of schooling 
infrastructure and had fiscal autonomy.
Hexagonal classrooms finally started to appear all over the country once 
the national government provided additional funding for local school 
construction through the Social Investment Fund FIS (Fondo de Inversión 
Social, later renamed FPS Fondo Nacional de Inversión Productiva y 
Social), which had adopted the requirements of the Ministry of Education 
as a project standard. As the design became more familiar and appreciated, 
mayors started to adopt the reform classroom even if their projects were 
financed from non-SIF resources (Schulz-Heiss 2011).
Standardisation is also used as a tool for policy coherence between different 
governance scales and to mainstream national policies, quality standards 
and norms in decentralised projects.
Project standards can be applied to the mainstream sector as well as 
cross-cutting concerns like the consideration of gender aspects in project 
identification and implementation (Kuehnast 2003) or mainstreaming 
participatory approaches in local investment decisions as is the case in 3rd 
generation SIFs in Africa today assisted by German financial cooperation 
(interview KfW/Governance Policy Division, Frankfurt, 10 Aug. 2010). 
SIF standards can also become national benchmarks for local investments, 
for example by establishing maximum unit costs for construction (compare 
Bhatia 2005, 27; as an example see FISE 2001).
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Not all small-scale, local projects are suitable for standardisation and mass 
production, and the pros and cons in designing project menus needs to be 
considered carefully:
The more open the menu of possible investments, the greater the room for 
choice at the community level, and the more likely that the social fund is 
financing investments that are the top priority for the community. However, 
an open menu reduces the potential for efficiency through standardization 
and specialization, and makes it more difficult for the social fund agency 
to meet all the sector-specific technical and institutional requirements for 
sustainability (Carvalho / Gillian / White 2004, 23).
4.1.5 Poverty targeting mechanisms
Poverty targeting plays a central role in fund disbursement because an 
overarching self-defined goal of SIFs is to the benefit of the poor. ‘The poor’ 
are usually the main target group of SIF investments: 
The poor, poorer, poorest, or poverty are mentioned in the objectives of 
more than three quarters of social fund projects. Furthermore, the poor, 
or some category of poor people, are an explicit target group in the 
majority of cases (‘poor’ in 80 percent of projects, ‘poorest’ in 46 percent 
of projects, ‘vulnerable’ in 44 percent of projects, and ‘low-income” in 
10 percent of projects). [...] Other target groups are ‘unemployed’ (in 20 
percent of projects), ‘indigenous’ (in 10 percent of projects), and ‘women’ 
(in 61 percent of projects) (World Bank 2002, 12).
Targeting takes place through a number of approaches and mechanisms, 
including the design of menus and targeting criteria as well as the design of 
rules and procedures of community participation regarding the identification 
of project priorities, the formation of project committees or implementation 
(Jorgensen / Van Domelen 1999, 7; Van Domelen 2007, vi).29
Four basic approaches are being used by SIFs: implicit and explicit targeting 
mechanisms and proactive and reactive approaches (World Bank 2002, 15; 
Carvalho / Gillian / White 2004, 21). Through the design of the project 
menus and the definition of activities being financed, SIFs can implicitly 
29 For an overview of elements of a social fund targeting mechanism, see Van Domelen 
2007, iv. The toolkit aims to provide “concepts, empirical evidence, noteworthy case 
studies of different approaches and the operational elements necessary to develop more 
comprehensive poverty and vulnerability targeting mechanisms” (Van Domelen 2007, i).
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favour activities of interest to the poor and/or of a public nature. Explicit 
targeting techniques include poverty maps or allocation formula, often 
based on data on the geographic distribution of poverty combined with 
population data. Usually they are geared to the district level for reasons of 
data availability (see World Bank 2002, 84). The kind of data being used 
usually depends on the fund’s purpose where indicators in an education 
project (should) differ from health projects for example. 
“Proactive targeting allocates funds in a pro-poor manner either by 
excluding the better-off (a cut-off) or using a progressive allocation rule” 
(World Bank 2002, 15) For example, the Zambian Social Investment Fund 
(ZAMSIF) has a formula for district allocations that “gives much more 
weight to the poorest districts than to those that are less poor: the poorest 
of all receive $30 a head and the least poor only $1.30” (Carvalho / Gillian 
/ White 2004, 21).
Reactive targeting instead waits for requests from communities and favours 
those from poor districts by applying eligibility criteria like poverty data, 
“and/or by reducing the required level of community contribution” (World 
Bank 2002, 15, 168), or the rate of co-financing.
Prioritisation through the rate of co-financing can serve two purposes, or 
a balanced blend of both. ‘Discounts’ in beneficiaries’ contribution may 
be introduced to reflect differences in the ‘ability to pay’ of communities, 
similar to price reductions for the unemployed, students or the elderly. In SIF 
programmes, they are typically based on local poverty indicators available 
and published country-wide, in order to make the intended pro-poor bias 
transparent and non-discretional.
Differences in the rate of co-financing have been also introduced to reflect 
priorities of national policies. For example, the required co-financing by 
local governments may be higher for the extension of electricity grids than 
for the provision of drinking water, thereby reflecting national priorities for 
sanitation in a given country at a given moment. Local governments are 
expected to react to this market-like signal.
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4.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the operational model
4.2.1 Strengths
The above analysis has shown that the SIF model can be adapted to a 
wide range of policy goals and that products have been diversified over 
time in response to new and changing needs of public policies. SIFs have 
“been successful in channeling substantial external resources toward 
local development, disbursing rapidly and achieving their physical output 
targets” (World Bank 2002, 48). Accordingly, SIFs have been valued for 
their “organizational effectiveness and innovation in project management” 
(Bhatia 2005, 3 based on World Bank 2002), cost-effective outputs 
(Bhatia 2005, 69),30 as a “quick and efficient investment mechanism that 
allows communities to take the lead” (Bhatia 2005, 1), or as an efficient 
institutional model that promotes concrete results at the local level (De 
Silva / Sum 2008, 25).
The key operational characteristics that particularly contribute to 
effectiveness and efficiency are the degree of autonomy required to 
achieve project objectives, community-involvement in decision-making, 
institutional specialisation, standardisation of procedures, and the bundling 
of projects as well as outsourcing or sub-contracting parts of the project 
cycle to local government and non-government actors. SIFs have fostered 
partnerships between government agencies, the private sector, NGOs and 
community-based organisations and have been able to mobilise capacity 
and community resources and “in some cases have strengthened the private 
sector capacity”, e.g. capacities in contracting (World Bank 2002, xxix).
SIFs have many operational features and procedures that contribute to 
transparency in fund management. Bhatia even puts forward as a key hypothesis 
of the review “that social funds are cost-effective primarily because they 
reduce corruption”, however, has to admit that there is “insufficient evidence 
to come to a definite conclusion” (Bhatia 2005, x). Nevertheless, the author 
emphasised the “high degree of transparency in social fund operations” 
(Bhatia 2005, 66). Means that promote transparency include computerised 
management information systems, widely distributed operation manuals, 
30 “Social funds do not always have lower unit costs than other kind of agencies, but there 
is notable variation across countries and sectors” (Bhatia 2005, 1 based on Rawlings / 
Sherburne-Benz / Van Domelen 2004).
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sustained information education and communication campaigns, simple and 
transparent procurement practices, including databases on unit costs, and, 
last but not least, frequent audits (Bhatia 2005, viii, x, 27, 69).
In a survey of 29 funds, the majority of funds were audited by national 
auditors supplemented by international firms. Most SIFs are included in 
the government budget and are covered in the auditor general’s report 
to parliament. Again, the majority of funds “had an accounting officer 
responsible for answering to parliament on the proper use of funds” and 
“there was a high likelihood of scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee” 
(Bhatia 2005, 37, 107).31
The strength of SIFs is their specialisation on the delivery “of small-scale 
infrastructure […] where the community-level requirements for technical, 
institutional, and financial sustainability are usually less complex” (World 
Bank 2002, 49). Accordingly, channelling funds through SIFs should be 
considered “when deficiencies in small-scale infrastructure are a significant 
constraint in development” (Carvalho / Gillian / White 2004, 13). Some 
case studies conclude that the “quality of social infrastructure and level 
of service is better in areas served by social funds than in ones served by 
other agencies” (Bhatia 2005, 1, based on Rawlings / Sherburne-Benz / Van 
Domelen 2004).
Critics maintain that “SIFs appeared more interested in bricks and cement 
than in development outcomes” (Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 96). 
As the shift to the third generation model shows, SIFs can also finance 
longer-term development goals, however this requires 
significant changes in the social fund agency’s performance incentives, 
staffing, and skills mix. […]. For example, building capacity and social 
capital at the community level are time- and human resource-intensive 
processes, making disbursements potentially slower and less predictable 
(World Bank 2002, 48).
Evidence on outcomes and welfare impacts (e.g. school enrolment, 
incidence of diarrhoea, infant mortality) shows that communities supported 
31 However, “the World Bank and donors often establish parallel auditing systems for their 
projects that undermine developing countries supreme audit institutions, on whose work 
they cannot always rely. That demonstrates that this issue is not specific to social funds, 
but that it is part of the wider impact that donor funding has on recipient countries” 
(Bhatia 2005, 37).
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by SIFs do not necessarily perform better than non-SIF communities. One 
reason given for a limited impact on key development indicators is that SIFs 
face challenges in ensuring complementary inputs for the operation and 
maintenance of a project investment (see also below; World Bank 2002, 
xvii; compare also Carvalho / Gillian / White 2004, 7).
While the impacts on development and effects for the poor are not always 
clear, there is sufficient evidence that allows for the conclusion that SIFs 
were able to implement a pro-poor funding approach. Funds reach the 
poor and poorest people both at the geographic and household levels 
(Van Domelen 2007, 22; World Bank 2002, 12ff; Bhatia 2005, 1 based on 
Rawlings / Sherburne-Benz / Van Domelen 2004; Schady 1999)32, however, 
there is little systematic data on targeting outcomes at the household level33, 
particularly for decentralised allocation schemes (see Faust 2012).34 A 
World Bank evaluation from 2002 concludes:
At the geographic level, poorer areas received more social fund resources 
per capita than better-off areas. This result attests to the strong demand 
for support expressed from poor areas, as well as improved outreach and 
targeting efforts by the social funds. At the household level, the majority 
of beneficiaries were poor, and the poorest of the poor showed reasonable 
access to benefits – the poorest ten percent of the people represented 
between 8 and 15 percent of social fund beneficiaries, depending on 
the country studied. As community infrastructure cannot exclude any 
community member from access, better-off households also benefited [in a 
range of 29 to 45 percent of social fund investment]. In all cases analyzed, 
social funds were at least as well targeted and usually better targeted than 
other social programs, and typically much better targeted than general 
public social and municipal spending (World Bank 2002, 153).
Particularly Peru has succeeded in allocating “a significant share of its 
resources to the poorest districts with continual fine-tuning of the targeting 
mechanism and a focus on rural areas that led to improved performance 
over time” (World Bank 2002, 13). In 2007 Van Domelen concludes that 
32 The study by Schady (1999) “shows that FONCODES funds flowed disproportionately to 
poor provinces” (Bhatia 2005, 65).
33 See Van Domelen 2007, ii; and World Bank 2002, 12–13. The analyses refer to the 
same data set in 6 countries: Armenia, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, and Zambia 
published in Rawlings / Sherburne-Benz / Van Domelen 2004.
34 Faust (2012) looks at the allocation patterns of Bolivia’s decentralised FPS and related 
diffusion and neighbourhood effects. 
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common to all country findings, the poorest districts provinces received 
at least their population share based on poverty ranking. This refutes the 
assertion that within demand driven programs the poorest districts lack the 
capacity to participate (van Domelen 2007, ii). 
At the general district level, however, “allocations are still best described as 
mildly progressive” (World Bank 2002, 13).35
Evidence shows that community-level investments reflect expressed 
local priorities (Bhatia 2005, 1 based on Rawlings / Sherburne-Benz / 
Van Domelen 2004; World Bank 2002, 17) and the levels of household 
satisfaction with the chosen project (Van Domelen 2007, ii). Whether the 
top-ranking priority was chosen is difficult to determine as results vary. 
Project choice can be influenced by elite capture or the strategic behaviour 
of the community in choosing a lower priority if deemed more likely to be 
approved (Van Domelen 2007, ii–iii).
Finally, the experience has shown that SIFs are strong in contexts of ineffective 
institutions. As SIFs are usually set-up as autonomous or semi-autonomous 
agencies parallel to a government, they “have a clear and significant role 
when existing institutions are ineffective and the need for flexibility and speed 
is paramount” (Carvalho / Gillian / White 2004, 13), for example, after natural 
disasters, in post-conflict situations or in fragile contexts. In this context, the 
SIF model has been frequently implemented, for example, in South Asia and 
Africa in response to disasters or conflict combined with goals of political 
and social stabilisation (IEG 2011, 18). In channelling support directly to 
communities, SIFs are also able to support informal risk management 
mechanisms (De Silva / Sum 2008, 25, compare Sub-section 3.2.2). 
4.2.2 Weaknesses and trade-offs 
The particular operational design features of SIFs can be seen as a strength, 
but depending on the policy and project objectives, they also have their 
trade-offs and negative aspects. Some points of criticism such as corruption 
or political interference in investment decisions are more generic in nature 
(Bhatia 2005, 71) and not specific to SIFs, but might, however, have received 
more attention in the context of SIFs due to the large volumes that some 
funds managed to attract.
35 For further information on targeting outcomes and performance of SIFs, see also World 
Bank 2002, 12–13, 89ff, and 153. 
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Some points of criticism also relate to trends in development thinking and 
reflect trade-offs inherent in policy targets. For example, reaching the most 
vulnerable communities directly, claimed to be a ‘success’ by 2nd generation 
funds, may cause collateral damage to local governments that get by-passed 
on the way. Vice versa, 3rd generation funds exclusively focussing on (local) 
governments may suffer ‘leakages’ when trying to reach the communities 
most in need.
Among the particular design features and objectives of SIFs, there are two 
areas that repeatedly elicited criticism and debates: One area centres on 
limitations in reaching the poorest and the challenges involved in working 
with local communities. The other, more substantial area, centres on the 
institutional feature of autonomy and the wider implications and impacts on 
national institutions and public financial management. 
Limits in reaching the poorest and working with the community
While the demand-driven approach in project selection and the role of the 
community-based arrangement is generally acknowledged, there are also 
voices of caution highlighting the limits in reaching the poorest and working 
with the community: 
 • Limits in reaching the poorest: “Eliciting local demand can allow local 
participation in subproject decision making and management, but it may 
make it difficult to reach the poorest communities which are often least 
competitive in preparing and presenting proposals” (Carvalho / Gillian 
/ White 2004, 5; IDB 1998, 5). The poorest groups tend to be poorly 
organised and least equipped to solicit benefits from demand-based 
programmes (Subbarao et al. 1997, 137). “Often communities compete 
at the municipal level for financial support; one of the lessons from this 
approach is that the priorities expressed by a community are likely to 
reflect the needs of the majority, while the needs of more vulnerable 
members such as orphans, female-headed households, disabled, and 
elderly, may not be heard” (Gibbons 2004, quoted in Vermehren / 
Serrano-Berthet 2005, 110).36
36 This was one of the reasons why SIFs introduced programmes with special target groups 
as part of a country’s social safety nets (see examples in Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 
2005).
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 • Dependency and influence of local leaders: Access of the poorest to 
SIF funds depends on the capacities of local leaders or ‘prime movers’ 
(e.g. a local chief or headmaster; see e.g. Carvalho / Gillian / White 
2004; UN Habitat 2009, 19; World Bank 2002, 17, 48). While the vast 
majority of beneficiaries were satisfied with the chosen subproject, the 
demand-driven approach is not necessarily synonymous with responding 
to the highest priority problem of the community (World Bank 2002, 
48, 17). The community-driven mechanism allows a bias for certain 
sectors “because of the important role of prime movers in […] project 
formulation, submission, and implementation” (World Bank 2002, 48). 
While there is consistent evidence that community leadership plays a 
critical role, “it is less clear whether it is for good or ill” (Van Domelen 
2007, iii); on the problem of “capture or manipulation by local elites”, 
see also Bhattamishra / Barrett 2008, 59, 62–63).
 • Limits in technical decision-making and management: “Although 
community-based arrangements may have superior local knowledge 
and achieve better targeting and contract enforcement outcomes, they 
may face limitations in technical decision-making and management” 
(Bhattamishra / Barrett 2008, 61).
 • Limits in dealing with externalities or economies of scales: “[…], 
local decision-making may help to overcome information asymmetries 
by bringing to bear local knowledge, but does not lend itself to projects 
that require decisions to be made above the local level in order to deal 
effectively with externalities or to tap economies of scale” (Carvalho / 
Gillian / White 2004, 5).
 • Crowding out: Supporting informal risk management arrangements, 
SIFs need to be designed carefully to avoid i) displacing these and/or the 
role of related initiatives by NGOs or the private sector and ii) to avoid 
moral hazard by inducing risky behaviour (Carvalho / Gillian / White 
2004, 9; on crowding out effects see Bhattamishra / Barrett 2008, 58).
Impacts on national institutions and public financial management
Bypassing public sector bureaucratic procedures, the SIFs’ autonomy 
allowed funds to be channelled to communities rapidly, in a transparent 
manner and at low administrative costs during times of crisis. While such 
SIF interventions are of less concern when designed as temporary, short-
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term measures, their impact on overall public sector management became 
a key concern in many countries when SIFs pursue longer-term policies 
complementing social sector policies (Subbarao 1997, 156) and when SIFs 
provide similar investments as existing government agencies (Vermehren / 
Serrano-Berthet 2005, 96). 
A key question is whether SIFs help build institutional capacity or whether 
they displace, weaken or even undermine existing government institutions 
and reforms (Bhatia 2005, vii). Some analysts claim that innovations in 
fund operations altogether “inspired rather than undermined” reforms 
in public sector management (De Silva / Sum 2008, 4). Critics question 
that the innovations are transferable to permanent public-sector agencies 
or even provide a threat or moral hazard to improvements in public sector 
management at large (De Silva / Sum 2008, 4; World Bank 2002, xxvi). 
SIF support can, for instance, discourage local governments to improve 
the efficiency of their own local tax system. This can be the case if project 
selection criteria favour those with low amounts of tax revenues and block 
transfers from national government budgets. Such ‘compensatory fiscal 
transfers’ are a well-known moral hazard from past SIF experiences, for 
which a careful balancing of the incentive structure became a concern in 
SIFs of the 3rd generation. Here, measures designed to this end included 
the allocation of additional SIF funding as a reward for an above-average 
record in the operation and maintenance of public works or other indicators 
of good local governance.
Another major concern is the lack of integration into and coordination 
with government processes (Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 96; Bhatia 
2005, 4; Juntermann / Schickinger 2004). Social funds are even accused 
of undermining sectoral coordination (Bhatia 2005, ix). Coordination with 
government agencies is seen as one of the biggest challenges to avoid the 
negative implications for the management of public expenditure (Bhatia 
2005, 38; World Bank 2002, xxvi; Tendler 2000 in Bhatia 2005). Past 
SIFs “did not sufficiently follow line ministries’ policies and guidelines” 
Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 96) and “have ability to divert attention 
away from existing, accountable, governmental structures” (UN Habitat 
2009, 24). 
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If not designed well, SIFs can have adverse effects on the public sector37 as 
shown by experience (Carvalho / Gillian / White 2004, 9) and a World Bank 
evaluation. SIFs had 
negative institutional effects for public planning processes and budget 
accountability when they have been inadequately integrated in […] 
processes at central or local levels and when social fund disbursements 
have accounted for a significant share of public expenditure (World Bank 
2002, xxix).
Coordination needs are particularly apparent with regard to recurrent 
sectoral budgets and maintenance costs and technical standards (Bhatia 
2005, 38).38 Past SIFs were accused of not ensuring the technical and 
financial sustainability of investments and nobody seemed to be responsible 
for maintaining the infrastructure (Vermehren / Serrano-Berthet 2005, 96). 
As SIF projects are usually limited in time, it needs other government entities 
and partners to assure recurrent expenditure needs are met (UN Habitat 2009, 
24; Carvalho / Gillian / White 2004). The lack of infrastructure maintenance 
can also be related to the lack of civic ownership and motivation as the 
community engagement of SIF interventions ends with the delivery of the 
project (UN Habitat 2009, 24).
Finally, creating a specialised fund involves the danger of duplication 
between funding activities while parallel structures can create “shadow 
governments” (Bhatia 2005, 17 based on Goodman et al. 1997). SIFs have 
been accused of being funded off-budget, thus escaping financial oversight 
and parliamentary control (Bhatia 2005, 20, 29). An internal survey of the 
institutional structure of 29 social funds by the World Bank concluded that 
86 % of them were included in government budgets. However, as highlighted 
by Bhatia (2005, 29 and Annex 5), a detailed study on financial management 
arrangements and the integration of SIFs in national budgetary processes is 
missing.
37 For example: negative competition effects, negative resource mobilisation and allocation 
effects/undermining inter-governmental fiscal frameworks; negative systematic planning 
and accountability.
38 “Mechanisms to coordinate social fund activities with recurrent sectoral budgets and 
technical standards typically depend on (i) line ministry representation on social fund 
steering committees, (ii) framework agreements between social funds and line ministries 
that define cooperative agreements at various stages of the project cycle, and (iii) line 
ministry approval for subprojects” (Bhatia 2005, 38 based on World Bank 2002).
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Whether the SIF model can have a role in adaptation finance finally needs 
be considered in a country-context. Strength and trade-offs of the model 
depend on “project objectives, the nature of services to be delivered, and 
the country context” (Carvalho / Gillian / White 2004, 5). Five factors in 
particular should be looked at in a given context (see World Bank 2002, Box 
5.1 for further details):
1. The strength of existing institutions and public sector reforms in a 
country;
2. The national budgeting process, structure of public expenditures, and 
sectoral planning;
3. The extent of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralisation;
4. The social structure and capacity of a community context (World Bank 
2002, 49–50; Carvalho / Gillian / White 2004, 13); and
5. The nature of required goods and services (Carvalho / Gillian / White 
2004, 13).
As outlined in Sub-section 3.4, SIFs took three principal strategic roles 
in institutional contexts: they were used as engines of local development, 
as laboratories for innovation and as promoters of social capital. Because 
the SIF model works particularly well in situations of dysfunctional 
institutions, SIFs had and can have two additional roles in two situations 
where institutional autonomy is an asset:
1. “Stop-gap: Government structures and systems are dysfunctional and 
the Fund provides a temporary means of channeling resources to the 
local level.
2. Compensatory: There are exceptional problems that the regular transfer 
systems or sectoral programming are not well designed to address, such 
as natural disasters, discrimination of minorities, or deep pockets of 
poverty” (Serrano-Berthet 2007, 2).
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5 Potentials, limits and challenges of using social 
investment funds for adaptation finance 
SIFs have played an important role as an agency for the delivery of public 
investments to the local level. For this purpose, SIFs can be and have 
been designed in a flexible manner according to changing national and 
international policy environments and development currents. SIFs have 
been established in all regions in more than 60 countries and have been used 
to channel high financial volumes for local-level development activities. 
It is likely that SIFs are still part of the institutional landscape in a vast 
number of developing countries. Between 2000 and 2007, the SIF portfolio 
still represented more than 60 percent of IDA lending for social protection 
operations, for example. The quantitative extension, the existence of the SIF 
model over time in many countries, combined with a thematic closeness 
to the needs of adaptation to climate change turn them into a potential 
financing model for local adaptation activities for many countries.
As the analysis on strengths and trade-offs of the SIF model has shown, 
its rationale and appropriateness for adaptation finance should explicitly be 
considered in a country context. Whether some of the SIF characteristics, 
such as institutional autonomy, develop into a strength or weakness depends 
on the role of SIFs in an institutional arrangement in a country context and 
on the objectives of the activities to be financed. In this regard, whether 
the SIF model is appropriate for adaptation finance and for which kind of 
adaptation activities finally needs to be determined from the perspective of 
a country’s adaptation policy and institutional context. Balancing the related 
trade-offs of the SIF model, also means considering whose adaptation needs 
and goals within a country should be supported through the SIF model. As 
the analysis of SIF generations shows, the financing model can be beneficial 
for one target group, e.g. a local community, while at the same time 
having adverse effects at another scale, weakening e.g. local government 
administrations.
The analysis shows that SIFs and adaptation finance share common concerns 
which provide potential entry points for the use of SIFs in adaptation finance. 
In general, these common concerns comprise the goal of targeting financial 
support towards poor and vulnerable people in particular and implementing 
an integrated funding approach. In the context of these shared concerns, SIFs 
are generally in a good position to (help) meet current adaptation funding 
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requirements and challenges and can potentially take over several political 
and institutional functions in adaptation finance. There are, however, also 
adaptation-specific challenges as detailed below.
5.1 Meeting adaptation funding requirements?
The current political agendas in the field of climate change and development 
effectiveness led to the formulation of financing requirements which were 
synthesised in integrated assessment criteria and questions as outlined 
in Box 5 in Section 2. Looking at the operational characteristics of and 
experience with SIFs, as detailed in Section 4 in summary, to what extent 
are they in a position to meet these funding requirements?
Support the vulnerable, gender specific
While SIFs can be an institutional option for the distribution of international 
climate finance in many vulnerable countries, they have not been established 
in all, as available analysis on the geographical distribution indicates. 
However, to date there is no comprehensive overview on where the SIF 
model has been used. 
At the country level, SIFs have gained substantial experience and performed 
well in targeting resources to poor or vulnerable districts, local governments 
or community groups. To consider the needs of particularly vulnerable 
groups within poor communities, many SIFs introduced programmes for 
special target groups, women playing an important role as beneficiaries 
of these programmes. This experience generally places the SIF model in a 
good position to implement a targeted funding approach, despite the limits 
and challenges (see Sub-section 4.2) that exist in practice in reaching the 
poorest and most vulnerable groups. Part of the SIF model’s success builds 
on community participation in project selection, design, implementation 
and management (for stakeholder involvement, see also text on transparency 
below). Considerable parts of the project cycle are delegated to communities, 
local governments and/or the private sector (see also below on SIFs as a 
learning experience for institutional design). This implementation structure, 
specific operational characteristics of SIFs, as well as the approach to 
bundle funds from a multitude of sources under one operational programme 
and institutional roof helped to reduce transaction costs and have allowed 
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past SIFs to support many small-scale projects (see also the text on cost-
effectiveness/efficiency below).
Cost-effectiveness and efficiency
SIFs are known for their cost-effective and efficient way of channelling 
resources. The SIF model is seen as a pioneer in working with and 
subcontracting work to local actors through innovations in project 
management and organisational procedures which has led to the effective 
and speedy implementation of numerous small-scale projects at the local 
level. However, effectiveness and efficiency are particularly due to the 
specialisation on small-scale investments in social infrastructure that have 
a limited technical, institutional and financial complexity that both allow 
standardisation and specialisation on the side of the SIF agency and are 
manageable for a community. Specialisation and standardisation have been 
important factors in reducing transaction costs. The comparative advantages 
in cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the SIF model are less clear in 
the context of the increasing complexity of a project and/or considering 
potential additional costs necessary to ensure complementary investments 
to maintain a SIF investment and welfare impacts over time.
The country-driven and integrated approach
The SIF model offers a good opportunity for an integrated approach to 
adaptation finance at the policy level. SIFs could especially play a role at 
the interface of adaptation to climate change, social protection and risk 
management due to the overlap in goals, concepts and approaches (compare 
Sub-section 3.4). From an institutional perspective, the same holds true 
if SIFs are considered as an isolated institution. They offer an integrated 
institutional approach by bundling different channels and sources of 
international and domestic finance and integrating them under a common 
institutional and operational roof. However, if seen in the wider context 
of public financial management, the links and degree of coordination 
with government institutions is less clear and can imply many trade-offs 
(see text on coordination below). While one asset of SIFs was to pilot and 
establish, for example, new procurement models, the lack of integration 
into public financial management systems and use of country systems has 
been criticised in many SIF operations. While audits, for example, were 
frequently undertaken by national auditors, parallel systems had also been 
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used (compare Sub-section 4.2). Depending on the purpose of the fund, 
this lack of integration can also be a calculated move and can be seen as 
strength, as in the case of emergency-type SIFs.
Coordination
The track-record with regard to coordination is mixed. To what extent SIFs 
help avoiding parallel implementation structures highly depends on the 
degree of autonomy granted. If seen as an isolated institution, SIFs allow 
for a coordinated funding approach by bundling funds from a multitude 
of sources (compare above). However, as SIFs often operate in parallel to 
other existing government entities (such as line ministries), coordination 
with national policies, guidelines and standards and the integration into 
government processes is seen as one of the main challenges (compare 
also related criticism in Sub-section 4.2). The degree of integration of SIF 
programmes into national processes of budget management, however, has 
not been well studied.
Context specific
The evolution of SIFs over time has shown that the model can be adapted 
to different socio-economic contexts. The SIF model also allows one to 
consider context-specific information and requirements at the project level 
as it is based on a demand-driven approach in project selection and allows 
for modifications in project design. However, it is not the best choice for 
very small- or very large-scale investments in terms of financial volume or 
in terms of particular adaptation needs, being those that are highly context 
dependent, not repeatable or that cannot be standardised to a certain extent.
Transparency
From a theoretical perspective, SIFs adopted many operational practices 
that can promote transparency in fund operations. The board or steering 
committee can be a tool for integrating main stakeholders in the general 
design of the fund’s procedures, operations and political decisions. 
Operational practices that can promote transparency include community-
based contracting, accessible operation manuals and databases on 
procurement costs, information campaigns, or audits. However, the degree 
of transparency finally depends on the quality of implementation.
Providing international adaptation finance for vulnerable communities
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 93
5.2 Potential political and institutional functions of SIFs in 
adaptation finance
Experience with the application of the SIF model has shown that SIFs can be 
a strategic partner in adaptation finance. In a context of national institutional 
arrangements, SIFs can take over several functions which are potentially 
relevant for the implementation of adaptation policies. Beyond that, past 
SIF interventions can provide ‘lessons learned’ with respect to the design of 
institutional structures or they can be used directly or after modifications for 
distributing adaptation funds.
SIFs as a ‘strategic partner’ in adaptation finance
In the past, SIFs successfully took over functions in institutional 
arrangements and in the delivery of resources that overlap with the important 
requirements of (international) adaptation finance and/or play an important 
role in adaptation processes as such. Four basic functions can be identified 
from the literature (compare Sub-sections 3.4, 4.2; Vermehren / Serrano 
2005; Serrano-Berthet 2007):
1.  SIFs acted as engines of local development in (directly) supporting 
vulnerable regions, districts or communities. Adaptation finance should 
also support vulnerable groups and communities, but so far the delivery 
mode to local levels is often unclear and/or contested. 
2.  SIFs acted as laboratories for innovation in delivering investments to 
the ground, at times even inducing wider sector reforms. Innovation in 
the delivery of finance is also an overarching goal or need in adaptation 
finance. Adaptation finance currently offers a window of opportunity 
for innovations as the proposal of South Africa to the Adaptation Fund 
shows.
3.  SIFs acted as promoters of social capital by working in a multi-sectorial 
way at the local level, aiming to support communities in designing 
and managing own project activities and processes. The support of 
local level activities and institutions (should) play an important role in 
adaptation processes or related tasks, such as disaster risk reduction and 
management and therefore also in adaptation finance.
4.  SIFs acted as an interim solution in times of dysfunctional government 
institutions or crisis situations. As the SIF model has proven to work 
Britta Horstmann / Günther Schulz-Heiss
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)94
particularly well in these situations due to its autonomy, this could be an 
interesting financing model for adaptation needs in fragile governance 
contexts, after climate related disasters or in cases of discrimination of 
minorities who, due to a lack of access to social services, are highly 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.
As shown by the analysis, the decision on the role and function of SIFs 
in institutional adaptation financing arrangements is important as it can 
influence institutional design options and perspectives on these regarding 
their strength and weaknesses. For example, while a high degree of 
institutional autonomy of a SIF can be an asset in contexts of political 
fragility or after disasters, it can be judged negatively from the perspective 
of development effectiveness.
SIFs as a learning experience for institutional design
SIFs provide specific experiences in the institutional design of delivering 
funds for small-scale projects at the local level. With regard to the lack of 
experience in devolving international adaptation funds to the local level 
(compare Sub-section 2.4), the SIF model is particularly interesting with 
regard to its experience in resource targeting, devolving fund management 
to the local level, and promoting collaboration between public and private 
stakeholders. Past SIFs provide examples and ‘lessons learnt’ on community 
participation in project selection, design, implementation and management. 
They have elaborated models of stakeholder engagement in disbursing 
funds and procuring equipment and have been able to mobilise community 
resources and private contracting capacity. The involvement of local actors 
and institutions is a prerequisite for successful adaptation processes. Also, 
the need for private-sector engagement in adaptation action and finance has 
been repeatedly stipulated by political actors. So far, however, the actual 
engagement, related financial potential and possible roles of the private 
sector in adaptation processes and finance in distinction to the public 
sector are unclear. Here, SIFs offer one possible model for cooperation and 
engagement.
As a facility for channelling adaptation funds
Due to the relevant experience of SIFs and as SIFs still exist in many countries, 
they might also be directly used as an agency for channelling adaptation 
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funds or be adapted to also deliver funds for adaptation related activities 
and services, provided there is a benefit for adaptive capacities. The brief 
analysis shows that SIFs financed or still finance activities in a wide range 
of issue areas aimed at addressing one or several objectives and capacities 
that can also be relevant for adaptation processes, particularly in the area of 
risk management and social protection, whose links to adaptation have been 
widely acknowledged and analysed, but whose integrated implementation 
in practice is lacking behind (see Sub-section 3.4). For the last seven years, 
however, there has been no comprehensive overview on the status of SIFs in 
general and on the role of SIFs in the area of risk management in particular.
In general, the SIF model can be a strong partner at least for the distribution 
of parts of resources to communities vulnerable to climate change. However, 
there is one major drawback or condition: The suitability of the SIF model 
for adaptation finance presupposes that a certain minimum of communities 
share the same adaptation needs and therefore require the same or similar 
type of goods or services. If this is not given, the SIF model is probably not 
the best choice.
5.3 Adaptation-specific challenges for practical 
implementation
Based on these findings, what are the related adaptation-specific challenges 
for using the SIF model in adaptation finance in practice? From an 
institutional point of view, the main challenge is maximising the use of 
country systems by integrating an existing SIF into a national adaptation 
financing arrangement or applying key SIF principles to similar institutional 
entities dedicated to adaptation finance. From an operational point of view, 
the overall challenge is to factor in climate change-related risks and changes 
in SIF operations.
There are three main approaches and entry points to factor in climate 
change-related risks in the SIF model: i) mainstreaming (or climate 
proofing) climate change adaptation related risks into existing projects; 
ii) the identification of project types and the design of the project menus 
that specifically target adaptation needs; and iii) the design of targeting 
techniques that prioritise people and communities highly vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change.
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The first approach is currently, for example, being piloted in Peru in a joint 
approach between the HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation and the Peruvian 
social fund FONCODES, the National Cooperation Fund for Social 
Development. The main idea is to integrate climate change adaptation 
criteria and activities in the national FONCODES programme Mi Chakra 
Emprendedora – Haku Wiñay, in English: ‘my entrepreneurial farm’. This 
government-run programme for rural productive development focuses on 
populations in extreme poverty and aims at expanding and diversifying 
income-generating activities as well as production to guarantee food 
security. The pilot activity intends to integrate climate change adaptation 
requirements into rural, agriculture-related technologies and instruments 
for planning, managing and evaluating projects as well as in the training 
and technical assistance of technical staff and farm experts (yachachiq in 
the native language).
The second approach, the identification of project types and the design of 
a project menu are particularly challenging. Researchers generally stress 
the context-specific nature of adaptation activities. There are only a few 
studies that try to establish adaptation-related typologies.39 However, the 
SIF model requires a certain degree of standardisation of project activities 
which presupposes a minimum quantity of similar adaptation needs across 
a country with sometimes extremely different climatic conditions. In 
addition, the SIF experience shows that the project activity should ideally 
also be for the benefit of the whole community as a public good and 
avoid elite capture. Finally, there is the challenge of ensuring a high level 
of attribution in a project menu between one project type and its effects 
on vulnerability or adaptive capacity. While this project type might lead 
to reduced vulnerability in one place, it might somehow be beneficial in 
another place but not lead to reduced vulnerabilities against climate change 
risks. For constructing useful adaptation menus, a major challenge will also 
be the scale of analysis required. The analysis needs to look at the context-
39 See, for example, Maru / Langridge / Lin 2011: “We found a limited number of climate 
vulnerability and adaptation studies that directly and indirectly developed typologies to 
help understand climate risk, and the example applications of typologies that have been 
developed have limitations in rigour, validity and even practical utility at times” (Maru 
/ Langridge / Lin 2011, 1). For other typology related studies see, for example, Agrawal 
2008 on local types of institutions and adaptation practices; Sietz / Lüdeke / Walther 2011 
on the categorisation of vulnerability patterns, or Zorom et al. 2013 on farm typologies 
for the Sahel.
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specific details of social structures and the capacities of a community as 
well as the nature of required goods and services, and at the same time needs 
to be carried out on scale across the country.
The scale of analysis required and the requirements of related data can 
also be a challenge for the development of an adaptation-specific targeting 
strategy, the third entry point for factoring in climate change-related risks. 
Lack of climate data might constrict the usefulness of an allocation formula 
that links vulnerability indicators with climate or weather data. If weather-
related data, for example, is not comparable or available across regions, 
it might disadvantage regions and communities that are most in need. In 
this case, an alternative approach can be to focus on indicators for adaptive 
capacity. Here, similar to the identification of project types as outlined 
above, the challenge is one of attribution between the indicator and its 
relation to vulnerability or adaptive capacities in a climate change-context.
Outlook
The body of literature available after 25 years of operation of social 
investment funds worldwide has been sufficient to identify defining 
features, strength and weaknesses and to arrive at a number of conclusions 
with respect to the challenges of channelling the benefits of international 
adaptation finance to vulnerable communities. Towards an application of 
the SIF model in adaptation finance in practice, country-specific analysis, 
as well as an updated overview of its current use by international financing 
institutions and partners, would be useful. In particular, an analysis of SIFs 
in the area of risk management merits further attention.
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